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MERITS STRIPPING
Howard M. Wasserman*
Abstract
This article examines the concept of “merits stripping.” This occurs when
Congress, the Executive, or the courts eliminates, limits, or diminishes
enforceable substantive constitutional and statutory rights and the merits of
claims brought to enforce those rights in court. Courts and commentators often
conflate merits stripping with the controversial congressional attempts at
jurisdiction stripping. In fact, however, the concepts are distinct, and
understanding and respecting those distinctions is essential to understanding the
operation of substantive federal law in federal courts. This article defines merits
stripping and provides multiple examples of strips of constitutional and
statutory rights, affected by all three branches of government. It then examines
the doctrinal, normative, and theoretical differences between merits stripping
and jurisdiction stripping.
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MERITS STRIPPING
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly
sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly
killed and buried, [it] stalks our. . . jurisprudence once again .
. .**

Justice Scalia spoke (in his own unique style) of the much-maligned
Establishment Clause test of Lemon v. Kurtzman.1 But we might say the
same about the long-standing legal, political, and scholarly controversy
that similarly never goes away over congressional jurisdiction
stripping—Congress reducing or eliminating the power of the United
States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts to hear and resolve
particular classes of federal constitutional claims, usually involving
controversial issues and precedents.2
Congressional threats against the jurisdiction of the courts date to the
early days of the Union.3 Never killed and buried,4 the controversy
remains amid congressional rumblings about reigning in the “out-ofcontrol” judiciary.5 No such bills have gone anywhere and none is likely
**
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
1
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
2
See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962, 986 (2002) (“[M]ost discussions of
congressional regulation dwell on laws that deprive federal judges of power to hear a particular case
or class of cases because of its controversial nature, or what has come to be known as ‘jurisdiction
stripping.’”); see also Akhil ReedAmar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1499-1500 (1990) [hereinafter Amar, Two-Tiered] (identifying controversial
issues at play in the jurisdiction-stripping controversy, such as abortion and flag burning); Gerald
Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the
Ongong Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 895 (1984) (stating that most of the jurisdiction-stripping
proposals of the early 1980s stem from dissatisfaction with Supreme Court decisions, especially
those dealing with controversial social issues such as school prayer, abortion, and busing as a
remedy in school desegregation); see also Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury:
Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 980 (2000) [hereinafter Resnik,
Trial as Error] (“Protesting federal jurisdiction can also be a way to object to an underlying legal
norm . . .”).
For present purposes, I focus on strips of particular, discreet constitutional claims from the
grant of general federal question jurisdiction, apart from efforts to limit other forms of jurisdiction,
notably habeas corpus. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat.
2739 (2005); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2763-64 (2006) (holding that jurisdictionstripping provision did not apply retroactively, in part to avoid “grave questions about Congress’
authority to impinge upon this Court’s appellate jurisdiction”).
3
See Amar, Two-Tiered, supra note ___, at 1500 (“From the First Judiciary Act on, this
question has periodically occupied center stage in the high drama of national politics.”); Gunther,
supra note ___, at 896 (“Jurisdiction-stripping proposals have surfaced in Congress in virtually
every period of controversial federal court decisions.”).
4
See Lawrence Gene Sager, Forward: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 20 (1980) [hereinafter Sager,
Constitutional Limitations] 20 (“In large measure, our failure to lay these questions to rest is the
product of the mutual respect and self-restraint that have characterized the behavior of Congress and
of the Supreme Court in their dealings with one another.”).
5
See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note ___, at 984 (“When we turn to Congress, moreover, we
find a wide array of tools available to rein in a rambunctious judiciary.”); Caprice L. Roberts,
Jurisdiction in Three Acts: A Three-String Serenade, 51 VILL. L. REV. 593, 631 (2006) (describing
arguments that “Federal courts have run amok and tilted the balance of power among the three
branches too far” and that “Congress had to act in order to stop the despotism of the federal judicial
bench”); Sager, Constitutional Limitations, supra note ___, at 38 (“Perhaps Congress’ power to
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to do so.6 But discussion of the issue continues. One of several recent
examples is the Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, which would
deprive federal courts of original and appellate jurisdiction to hear any
claim against a government entity or officer for the “acknowledgement
of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty, or government.”7
The parameters of congressional power to jurisdiction-strip remains
the great, heretofore unresolved, debate among courts, procedure, and
constitutional law scholars.8 But bracketed from that debate is a distinct
approach to limiting the reach and impact of federal judicial power9-merits stripping.

regulate jurisdiction ought to be understood as its final trump, as an appropriate way for the national
legislature to curb a judiciary run amok.”).
6
See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note ___, at 988 (“The chronic failure of these efforts to
divest federal courts of jurisdiction easily could mislead one into believing that Congress cannot, as
a practical matter, effectively control federal judges by regulating their jurisdiction.”); Sager,
Constitutional Limitations, supra note ___, at 20 (arguing that, although jurisdiction-stripping
measures have been proposed, “Congress has almost always repudiated such efforts.”).
7
S.520, 109th Cong., §§ 101-102 (2005). Two other similar proposals are pending in the final
months of the 109th Congress. One is Marriage Protection Act of 2005, which would deprive
federal courts of original and appellate jurisdiction “to hear or decide any question pertaining to the
interpretation of, or the validity under the Constitution of,” the Defense of Marriage Act. Marriage
Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1100, 109th Cong., § 2(a) (2005). The Defense of Marriage Act,
enacted in 1996, provides that states need not give full faith and credit to same-sex marriages valid
in other states. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. A third jurisdiction-stripping proposal is Pledge Protection Act
of 2005, which would deprive the Supreme Court and lower federal courts of authority “to hear or
decide any question pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity under the Constitution of, the
Pledge of Allegiance . . . or its recitation.” Pledge Protection Act of 2005, S.1046, 109th Cong.
(2005); Pledge Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 2389, 109th Cong. (2005). The House passed the bill
in July 2006, but it was not expected to go far in the Senate.
8
See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
POWER 25 (2d ed. 1990) (describing “significant case law” indicating that Congress has significant
power to prohibit the Supreme Court from taking jurisdiction over cases allocated to its appellate
jurisdiction); id. at 29 (describing argument that, because Congress need not have created lower
federal courts, it could create such courts, but limit their jurisdiction); Akhil Reed Amar, A NeoFederalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV.
205. 229-30 (1985) [hereinafter Amar, Neo-Federalist] (arguing that the federal judiciary, consisting
of the Supreme Court and any lower federal courts, must have an original or appellate opportunity to
hear any cases involving federal questions); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Retrict
Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 504 (1974) (arguing hat “because of changing
circumstances, the framers’ aspirations for the national judiciary cannot be fulfilled today without
lower federal courts”); Gunther, supra note ___, at 921 (arguing against such enactments “because
they are unwise and violate the ‘spirit’ of the Constitution, even though they are . . . within the sheer
legal authority of Congress”); Henry Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953) (arguing that any
exceptions to jurisdiction “must not be such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court
in the constitutional plan”); Sager, Constitutional Limitations, supra note ___, at 65 (arguing that
limits on congressional power are crossed when Congress “attempts to divest the Supreme Court
and all other federal courts of jurisdiction at least to review state court decisions on constitutional
challenges to governmental behavior); id. at 76-77 (“When Congress manipulates jurisdiction in an
effort to deny recognition and judicial enforcement of constitutional rights, it has deliberately set
itself against the Constitution as the Court understands that document.”); see also REDISH, supra
note ___, at 42 (“To the extent, then, that Congress has limited federal court jurisdiction in a manner
than deprives a litigant of an independent forum for the adjudication of constitutional rights, the
exercise of that power could possibly be held unconstitutional, even though Congress’ action was an
otherwise wholly proper exercise of its Article III power.”).
9
See Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box: The Power of “Congress” to Attack the
“Jurisdiction” of “Federal Courts”, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1407 (describing the question of
jurisdiction-stripping as “somewhat unreal” because jurisdiction “is not necessarily the rigorously
narrow technical concept that experts on the subject would have it”); see also Ferejohn & Kramer,
supra note ___, at 1034 (“[I]t is far more typical for the Court to exercise jurisdiction while applying
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With merits stripping, what is stripped, reduced, or diminished is not
the adjudicative authority of the federal courts; rather, it is the scope,
reach, and applicability of substantive federal constitutional and
statutory rights. The plaintiff’s ability to vindicate and enforce federal
constitutional and statutory rights is stripped and her claim of right will
fail on the merits. Merits strips narrow who can sue whom over what
real-world conduct and for what remedy.10 The rights stripped or
diminished may be grounded in the Constitution or federal statute. The
strip may be effected by Congress, the President and the Executive
Branch, or the courts, acting individually or in some combination.
A merits strip occurs when new rules of positive law diminish the
scope of substantive rights. That is, the new rule shrinks, below some
baseline, the range of people protected by the right, the range of people
subject to the corresponding duty to act or not act in a given way, and the
amount of conduct protected or regulated. That baseline may be the
scope of rights and duties under the preceding body of law. Or the
baseline may be some normative standard as to the preferred or ideal
scope of the rights. This means, of course, that whether a strip has
occurred will be highly subjective, depending on what one views as the
“proper” scope of constitutional, statutory, or common law rights.11
Merits strips and jurisdiction strips arguably produce the same
result—imposing “door-closing and access-limiting rules”12 or limiting
“decisionmaking opportunities” for federal courts.13 This explains why
commentators14 and courts15 frequently confuse the two. And it perhaps
makes Louise Weinberg correct to argue that laws and judicial decisions
substantive legal tests that leave political actors free to choose their course of action without any
realistic threat of judicial intercession.”).
10
John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO.
L.J. 2513, 2515 (1998); see James Leonard, Ubi Remedium Ibi Jurs, Or, Where There’s a Remedy,
There’s a Right: A Skeptic’s Critique of Ex Parte Young, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215, 280 (2004)
(arguing that Congress “may therefore choose who is entitled to enforce a claim in court, and,
equally important, who may not”).
11
See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 6 (2004) (arguing that the object of constitutional interpretation is “the
project of bringing our political community into better conformity with fundamental requirements of
political justice”); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of
Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 421 (1993) [hereinafter Sager, Justice] (“[G]overnment
is obliged to energetically pursue the effacement of injustice’s entrenched consequences.”).
12
Weinberg, supra note ___, at 1408.
13
Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and
Altered Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2593 (1998) [hereinafter Resnik, Federal Courts].
14
See Judicial Conference of the United States, Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts,
reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49, 88-89 (1995) (describing dispute between “those who favor increased
‘federalization’ of the law against those who favor limiting federal court jurisdiction.”); Resnik,
Federal Courts, supra note ___, at 2615 (describing statute authorizing prosecution of particular
crime as a “jurisdiction-conferring statute” and the Supreme Court decision striking it down as
“arguing against federal jurisdiction for the statute”); Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note ___, at 979
(“As state and federal legislatures or courts come to be seen as friendly or hostile to certain groups
or claims (pro-labor or anti-labor, pro-corporations or anti-corporations, pro-civil rights or anti-civil
rights), granting or repealing federal jurisdiction provides a vehicle for advancing political goals
about substantive reforms . . .”); Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1035
(2006) [hereinafter Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity] (arguing that recognizing certain “actionable
federal constitutional claims would dramatically expand the jurisdiction of federal courts”).
15
See United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F. 3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc);
infra notes ___ and accompanying text.

Merits Stripping

-5–

repealing or limiting substantive rights and causes of action—what I here
describe as merits strips—may “loosely but realistically” be called limits
on jurisdiction.16
But they are not the same and should not be conflated or discussed
as if they are. First, there are essential differences between stripping the
substantive merits of claims of right and stripping judicial jurisdiction, a
subset of essential differences between substantive merits and subject
matter jurisdiction generally.17 The two concepts, even if producing
seemingly similar results, must be kept distinct.
Second, and more importantly, the two concepts do not, in fact,
produce similar results. The results look similar if the focus is on the
size of federal dockets (the number of actions filed in federal court).
Arguably, fewer plaintiffs will bring actions in federal court to vindicate
federal rights knowing those rights have been stripped to some degree
and that they are likely to lose on the claim.18 But several dispositive
distinctions emerge when we shift the focus to two other concerns: 1)
real-world actors and their real-world conduct and 2) the litigation
process itself.
One difference is textual, the linguistic direction of the stripping act.
Jurisdiction strips target the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts,
their raw adjudicative power to hear and resolve cases. Merits strips
target substantive legal rules, rights, and duties that protect and control
real-world actors and their real-world conduct.19
A second difference is what remains in the wake of the strip.
Jurisdiction stripping merely pushes cases out of federal court and into
state court, where litigants still may assert, and have vindicated, their
claims of federal right.20 Merits strips eliminate federal rights altogether;
a merits strip means no federal positive law provision exists as law
establishing a right that can be violated or enforced on the facts at issue,
in any court.21 A merits strip constitutes a far more direct and complete
limitation on federal rights. It also is a more transparent limitation,
signaling the public as to the true scope of substantive rights and better

16
See Weinberg, supra note ___, at 1407-08; see also Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note ___,
at 1004 (discussing link between size of federal docket and extent to which Congress regulates
under its powers).
17
Compare Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 644-45
(2005) [hereinafter Wasserman, Jurisdiction] (arguing that courts often fail to maintain the
necessary clear line between subject matter jurisdiction and substantive merits of federal claims of
right) with Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1614
(2003) (“[T]here is no hard conceptual difference between jurisdiction and the merits . . . . [T]he line
between jurisdictional issues and merits issues is always at some level arbitrary.”); see also Arbaugh
v. Y&H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1238-39 (2006) (resolving split as to whether element of Title VII
claims goes to jurisdiction of courts or merits of plaintiff’s claim under the statute).
18
See infra notes ___ and accompanying text.
19
See infra Part II.B.1.
20
See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 605, 628 (1981); Hart, supra note ___, at 1401; Sager, Constitutional Limitations,
supra note ___, at 40.
21
See infra Part II.B.2.
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allowing the pubic to hold rule makers democratically accountable for
unpopular limits on those rights.22
And a merits strip achieves a different result—a reduction not in
judicial jurisdiction, but in real-world conduct regulated. Federal courts
have jurisdiction over all civil actions “arising under” the Constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States.23 They can hear and resolve any
claims brought before them to vindicate rights established by federal
law.24 And the quantum of jurisdiction is undiminished by a merits strip;
the courts remain open and clothed with the power to adjudicate cases
asserting federal claims of right. The merits strip instead changes the
quantum of extant substantive federal law and rights; it diminishes the
amount of real-world actors and conduct subject to federal legal
protection or constraint and the degree of judicial enforceability of those
federal rights.25
The final difference is how the stripping enactment plays out in the
litigation process. First, the characterization of a stripping act
determines whether a particular legal rule applies to the case at hand. As
the Court recently reaffirmed in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,26 a jurisdiction
strip automatically applies retroactively to pending cases, while a merits
strip may not apply to pre-enactment conduct or may raise constitutional
concerns if it does.27 Proper characterization will be necessary as a
choice of law rule.
The characterization also affects the time and manner in which legal
and factual issues underlying the stripping enactment establishing the
legal rule will be resolved. A strip targeting jurisdiction will be resolved
at one stage in the litigation process, while a strip targeting the merits
will be resolved at another.28 Importantly, facts underlying a merits
stripping rule go, by definition, to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim and
thus, if in dispute, must be resolved at trial on the merits, with a jury
functioning as factfinder.29 Ultimately, the proper characterization of a
stripping rule may be necessary to protect the constitutional right to have
a jury as decision maker for disputed factual issues.30
Let me now pause to elaborate on two points about the framework
underlying these arguments. First, the concept of merits stripping rests
on a Hohfeldian understanding of rights and corresponding duties. If a
22
See Eisenberg, supra note ___, at 520-21 (describing spectrum of jurisdictional statutes,
with the more problematic end including “blatant efforts” to alter or reduce the impact of judicial
results); Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of Powers,
and the Democratic Process: Harnassing the Political Theory of United States v. Klein, 100 NW. U.
L. REV. 437, 450 (2006) (criticizing Congress for “political shell game” of manipulating procedure
rather than directly altering rules of decision); see infra notes ___ and accompanying text.
23
28 U.S.C. § 1331.
24
See Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 697-98.
25
See infra notes ___ and accompanying text.
26
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
27
See id. at 2764-65; id. at 2810 (Scalia, J., dissenting); infra notes ___ and accompanying
text.
28
See Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 649-52 (arguing that jurisdictional issues
and merits issues are resolved at different stages in the litigation process); infra notes ___ and
accompanying text.
29
See Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 654-55
30
See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; infra notes ___ and accompanying text.
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positive constitutional or statutory provision (as written and/or
interpreted) establishes a rule of law under which A can engage in some
conduct free from interference from B, that provision grants to A a
“right.” If no such positive law enactment exists, A has “no right.” If
the rule of law grants a right to A by requiring B to act or refrain from
acting in a certain way, then B is under a “duty.” And if that rule of law
does not exist, B is under “no duty” to act or refrain from acting.31 As
Corbin explains the framework, a right exists for A when legal rules
require government to aid A by controlling B and B’s conduct; if legal
rules do not require government to aid A as against B, he has no right.32
Second, a word about terminology. What we are talking about
might be better labeled “merits diminution”—a diminishing of the level
or quantum of rights and the amount of existing rights-creating
substantive law. I use the word “stripping” to maintain the parallel with
its oft-conflated counterpart, jurisdiction stripping. And the word is
accurate, capturing the notion of a diminution or reduction of something,
here, real-world rights.
But I do not use stripping in the pejorative sense often associated
with jurisdiction stripping.33 Nor do I question the structural or
constitutional legitimacy of merits stripping, of Congress or the courts
diminishing substantive rights. There is intellectual controversy over the
power and legitimacy of jurisdiction stripping,34 a controversy as to
which I remain agnostic for present purposes. The point is that there
should be no such controversy over the core examples of merits stripping
that I discuss. One may question the normative legal wisdom of a
stripping rule and we may wish that rights were broader than they are.
But that says nothing about the structural legitimacy of the stripping
act.35
This article catalogues the concept of merits stripping. It first
describes several of the forms that merits stripping can take and the
many legal actors who can effect strips. I identify six ways that subconstitutional (primarily statutory) rights can be stripped and multiple
ways that constitutional rights can be stripped, by courts, Congress, or
the executive, individually or in concert.36 I next examine several key
precepts forming the basis for the distinction between jurisdiction and
merits generally, and the narrower distinction between jurisdiction
stripping and merits stripping.37 Finally, I detail four essential facial and

31
See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913); Arthur L. Corbin, Jural Relations and their
Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 226, 229 (1921).
32
See Corbin, supra note ___, at 229.
33
See, Resnik, Federal Courts, supra note ___, at 2592-93 (“The issue has historically been
posed as if Congress was a predator, taking jurisdiction and remedial power away from the Article
III judiciary.”).
34
See Evan Caminker, Allocating the Judicial Power in a “Unified Judiciary”, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 1513, 1513 n.1 (2000) (discussing “wide range” of answers that scholars have provided to the
question of congressional control over judicial jurisdiction).
35
See infra Part II.B.4.
36
See infra Part I.
37
See infra Part II.A.
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functional distinctions between merits strips and true jurisdiction strips
and show why the concepts must be kept distinct.38
I. MERITS STRIPPING
Cass Sunstein recognizes that what “precedes any new legislative
enactment is always some body of law, whether legislatively or
judicially created.”39 There similarly is a preexisting body of law
preceding any new judicial decision interpreting the Constitution or
statute or any new executive regulation or enforcement decision.
The preexisting body of law establishes substantive legal rights in
some and imposes corresponding legal duties in others.40 When a
substantive right is merits stripped, rights and duties established by
preexisting positive-law rules are diminished or eliminated; so, too, is
the amount of conduct from which the rights-bearer is protected and the
amount of conduct which the duty-bearer must do or refrain from doing.
As previously stated, a merits strip occurs when new positive law—
constitutional or statutory, established by legislature, executive, or
judiciary—diminishes the scope of existing substantive rights. That is, a
new rule of law shrinks, below some baseline, the range of people
protected by a right, the range of people subject to a corresponding duty
to act or not act in a given way, and the amount of conduct protected or
regulated. That baseline may be the scope of rights and duties under the
preexisting body of law. Or the baseline may be some (admittedly
subjective) normative standard as to the preferred or ideal scope of
rights. The defining feature is that the level of existing rights and duties
rests below that line.
A. Statutory Merits Stripping: Six Forms
1. Failure to Enact Legislation
Congress can merits strip by considering and taking significant steps
to enact rights-creating or rights-expanding legislation, but ultimately
declining or failing to enact it, thereby leaving in place lower, arguably
insufficient preexisting levels of legal rights and duties.
One might resist defining failure to enact as a strip because nonenactment means that no rights ever were conferred (and no duties
imposed), not that pre-existing rights and duties had been eliminated or
diminished. No one can enforce anticipated rights not should one place
much reliance on them. And, in fact, not every failure to enact a rightscreating bill should be understood as a strip. It is too easy for one of 535
members of Congress to introduce a bill to say that introduction, without
more, created some baseline of rights and that the failure to enact

38

See infra Part II.B.
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 325 (2000).
40
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
39
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stripped rights below the baseline. And even a bill with broad support
and a seemingly good chance of passage is as likely to fail in the end.
The merits-strip label applies only to particular legislative situations
in which circumstances surrounding a proposal somehow create
expectations within Congress, the public, or the class of would-be
beneficiaries of rights. The anticipated new rights become part of the
normative baseline of substantive rights—what we prefer the baseline be
and, depending on how far the legislative machinery had progressed
before failing, what we expected or hoped the new baseline to become.
The question is when circumstances create reasonable enough
anticipations of a new baseline that the extant status quo becomes a
diminution.
a. Legislative Circumstances and Expectations
One possible point is when an issue has made it onto the “legislative
agenda” as one subject “to which government officials, and people
outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying
some serious attention at any given time.”41 This takes the issue beyond
a simple proposal and into a legal rule that the public and members of
Congress consider significant enough that they can and should expect it
to pass into law.42
The question then becomes when something makes it onto the
legislative agenda. Political scientist Sarah Binder looked to the
editorial pages of The New York Times, labeling any policy issue
discussed in an editorial a “potential enactment” and using the number of
editorials on an issue as a proxy for the significance of that issue and its
potential for enactment.43 Following this methodology, we might say
that significant attention on some proposed rights-creating legislation in
The Times creates expectations and a new baseline.
Another possible line is the level of presidential involvement with a
particular bill; substantial executive involvement signals that the bill is a
serious proposal under serious consideration. The modern President,
through formal and informal powers,44 “usually dominates the legislative

41
SARAH BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK 36
(2004); see id. (defining legislative agenda as “the range of policy ideas plausibly on the radar
screens of policymaking elite and active electorates”).
42
Cf. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2311, 2340-41 (discussing failure of divided government to pass potentially significant
measures that make it onto the legislative agenda).
43
BINDER, supra note ___, at 37. Binder explains that the editorial page in the nation’s paper
of record responds to issues under consideration in Washington and highlights public problems
deserving of attention. Id.
44
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (establishing legislative process, including presidential veto); id.
art. II, § 3 (defining presidential power to recommend to Congress “such Measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)
(describing the President’s lawmaking role as “the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the
vetoing of laws he thinks bad”); Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 4 (2002)(“Americans today identify the President as the Legislator-inChief.”).
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process from start to finish.”45 Serious presidential involvement and
support for some enactment, given the President’s ability to focus
legislative and national popular attention and support, often dictates the
difference between enactment and non-enactment of rights-creating
positive law.46 For example, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
refused to push antilynching legislation in the 1930s for fear of
alienating southern Democrats and destroying the rest of his New Deal
agenda and such legislation never was enacted.47 On the other hand, the
historic Civil Rights Act of 1964 arguably passed as a result of a
combination of President John F. Kennedy’s rhetorical ability to
convince the nation of the need for strong civil rights legislation and
President Lyndon Johnson’s political ability to push strong, meaningful
legislation.48 As unprecedented as the 1964 Act was,49 had the bill failed
something could be seen as having been taken away, as a result of that
strong presidential support.
Third, we might define non-enactment as a strip where individual
bills are part of a broader coordinated effort, inside and outside
Congress, to establish legal rights. Such an effort creates expectations
that, when no rights-creating legislation results, the movement’s failure
strips anticipated rights.
The paradigm might be the long push for federal protection from
race discrimination from the 1930s until passage of the 1964 Act.50 That
movement featured a significant legislative component. Two-hundred
fifty anti-discrimination bills were introduced between 1937 and 1950,

45
Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Thinking About Presidents, 90 CORNELL L. REV. ___,
___ (2005) (manuscript at 118); Kesavan & Sidak, supra note ___, at 63 (arguing that the
Constitution “envision[s] the President as an active participant in the embryonic stages of law
making”); McNollGast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 18 (1984) (arguing that the President influences the
content of legislation long before any bill is signed).
46
Delahunty & Yoo, supra note ___, at 121 (“The President’s ready access to the media . . .
allows him to set the terms of the nation’s political discourse and to focus it on the topics of
particular interest to him. . . . [T]he President usually can succeed in implementing major parts of
his program.”); McNollGast, supra note ___, at 17 (“An examination of the president’s role in the
legislative process leads inexorably to the conclusion that the president is a member of most
enacting coalitions.”).
47
CHARLES W. WHALEN & BARABAR WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT xiv (1985).
48
See ROBERT D. LOEVY, TO END ALL SEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF THE PASSAGE OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 324 (199).
49
See id. at 337 (“Clearly passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a great ‘rush of action’
following a ‘deadlock’ over civil rights for black Americans that had lasted for almost 100 years.”);
Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Poltical Theory of Legislative History: New
Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1423
(2003) [hereinafter Rodriguez & Weingast, New Perspectives] (“[B]y any measure, this statute
represents one of the landmark pieces of modern social legislation and a major effort b the national
government to address racial injustice in twentieth-century America.”).
50
See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation after Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 487-88 (2000) (arguing that the Act
emerged from a “complex history” of social activism, judicial decisions, and legislative action); see
generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) (tracing history of the twentieth-century Civil Rights
Movement).
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including 72 during 1949 and 1950.51 The number increased further
beginning in the late 1940s and throughout the 50s.
At the same time, civil rights advocates undertook a concerted
campaign of constitutional litigation against race discrimination,
culminating in the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision holding
unconstitutional “separate but equal” public school facilities in Brown v.
Board of Education.52 Congress, in turn, recognized these changes in the
judicial understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, which helped,
ultimately, to spur further legislative action.53 In the early 1960s, civil
rights protesters also brought a series of judicial challenges to Jim Crow
discrimination in places of public accommodation, with the protesters
generally prevailing in unanimous, albeit narrow decisions.54
Advocates simultaneously undertook a campaign of direct action
protests and demonstrations, most famously the 1957 Montgomery Bus
Boycott and the Freedom Rides of the early 1960s, which called national
public and political attention to the cause of racial desegregation.55 The
only civil rights measures enacted from Reconstruction until 1964—the
Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960—were congressional responses to
this direct action.56
And civil rights advocates continued to take their case to the streets
into the early 1960s (particularly through sit-ins and marches) and when
met by southern law enforcement with excessive force in response
(particularly in Birmingham, Alabama), captured on television and
broadcast to a nation, they brought the moral dimensions of the problem
to national public light.57 This, in turn, placed the issue front-and-center
on President Kennedy’s, and thus Congress’, legislative agenda.58

51

See Rebecca E. Zietlow, To Secure These Rights: Congress, Courts and the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945, 959 (2005).
52
347 U.S. 383 (1954); see also KLARMAN, supra note ___, at 463 (“Brown plainly inspired
blacks. To have the Court declare segregation to be unconstitutional was symbolically important,
and it furthered the hope and the conviction that fundamental racial change was possible.”).
53
See KLARMAN, supra note ___, at 366 (arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1957, the first
since Reconstruction, was made possible by Brown); Zietlow, supra note ___, at 992-93 (describing
members of Congress who saw Title VI of the 1964 Act as speeding up the enforcement of Brown’s
mandate); see also KLARMAN, supra note ___, at 467 (arguing that Brown made Jim Crow seem
vulnerable).
54
See Joel K. Goldstein, Constitutional Dialogue and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1095, 1097, 1099-1100 (2005); Post & Siegel, supra note ___, at 288 (arguing that the
federal courts became clogged with thousands of suits by protesters challenging Jim Crow laws);
see, e.g., Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373
U.S. 262 (1963).
55
See KLARMAN, supra note ___, at 467; LOEVY, supra note ____, at 21-23; WHALEN &
WHALEN, supra note ___, at xvi; Post & Siegel, supra note ___, at 491-92; Zietlow, supra note ___,
at 959-60. For a detailed discussion of the strategy and execution of the Montgomery Bus Boycott,
see Christopher Coleman, Laurence D. Nee, Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Social Moevments and SocialChange Litigation: Synergy in the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 663 (2005)
56
See WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note ___, at xvi.
57
See KLARMAN, supra note ___, at 428 (arguing that the violence that particular southern
politicians and leaders “cultivated, condoned, or unintentionally fomented proved critical to
transforming national opinion on race”); id. at
58
ESKRIDGE, supra note ___, at 2-3; KLARMAN, supra note ___, at 435-36; LOEVY, supra note
___, at 11-17; WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note ___, at 232-33; Goldstein, supra note __, at 110102; see also Klarman, supra note ___, at 436 (“Birmingham changed everything.”); Post & Siegel,
supra note ___, at 508 (“[I]t was not until thousands of protests forced the federal hand that
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The early unsuccessful or less successful legislative efforts,
combined with continued direct action, set the stage for the more
legislative serious run at civil rights in 1963-64. Enough people in
Congress, the executive branch, and the public finally saw racial equality
as an idea whose “time has come.”59 Had the Civil Rights Act of 1964
not been enacted or had it been watered down to a weak and ineffectual
shell, as both the 1957 and 1960 Acts arguably had been,60 it could be
described as taking away the substantive federal rights that this broad
campaign had sought to obtain.
b. Stripping by Non-Enactment
If we define some legislative non-enactment as a merits strip, what is
notable is that the legislative process itself effects the strip. The rules
and structure of the legislative process dictate the content of resulting
substantive law and the rights created (or not created) under that law.61
Legislation must clear numerous “vetogates”—procedural hurdles that
must be confronted and cleared and at which any piece of rights-creating
legislation can be defeated or narrowed.62 Legislative opponents may
kill or drain the force from a proposal—strip the rights—through these
processes.63
The most obvious of these hurdles is the constitutional command of
bicameralism and presentment, requiring that three distinct entities—the
House of Representatives, the Senate, and the Executive—approve the
identical piece of legislation.64 Rights-creating legislation may originate
Congress was finally willing to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to accomplish what the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment through they had achieved.”).
59
LOEVY, supra note ___, at 282-83 (quoting statement by Everett Dirksen); Goldstein, supra
note ___, at 1101 (quoting President Kennedy calling the moral issue “as old as scripture” and “as
clear as the American Constitution”).
60
Thurgood Marshall famously denounced the 1960 Act as “not worth the paper it’s written
on.” DANIEL M. BERMAN, A BILL BECOMES A LAW: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1960, 135 (1962);
see also WILIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRET, LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 4-5 (3d ed. 2001); LOEVY, supra note ___, at 24; WHALEN &
WHALEN, supra note ___, at xvi.
61
See McNollGast, supra note ___, at 18; Nicole L. Gueron, An Idea Whose Time Has Come:
A Comparative Procedural History of the Civil Rights Acts of 1960, 1964, and 1991, 104 YALE L.J.
1201, 1201 (1995) (emphasizing the influence of “procedural mechanisms relied upon by members
of Congress to transform a legislative aspiration into a binding law of the United States”).
62
See McNollGast, supra note ___, at 18 (“[A] bill must survive a gauntlet of veto gates in
each chamber, each of which is supervised by members chosen by their peers to exercise
gatekeeping authority.”).
63
See Rodriguez & Weingast, New Perspectives, supra note ___, at 1453 (arguing that
“institutional details of Congress” aid opposition legislators); Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth
of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV.
395, 462 (2003) [hereinafter Staszewski, Rejecting] (arguing that structural filters within the
legislative process provide a variety of opportunities to defeat proposed legislation); see also Daniel
B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations
(manuscript at 19) [hereinafter Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox] (arguing that these devices also
can be seen “as structuring the process of legislative bargaining”).
64
U.S. Const. art. I, § 7; The Federalist No. 62, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed.
1961) (“No law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the
people, and then of a majority of the states”); Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998)
(striking down statute that, in purpose and effect, allowed the President to amend a portion of
congressional statutes by repealing particular provisions in each).
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with any of the three actors.65 Initial control over proposals to change
existing public policy, as by creating new substantive rights is vested in
Congress, but divided between the two houses; the President’s power to
veto any congressional proposal means the President must be a partner to
the rights-creating bargain.66 All three institutions must produce an
outcome acceptable to the other two; conversely, an opponent within one
actor can defeat rights by drafting in a way she knows will ensure defeat
with another actor. One house may deliberately draft a bill in a way that
its leaders know will be acceptable to the other house.67 And both houses
must draft in a way acceptable to the President, on threat of a veto
subject to override only by a difficult-to-obtain 2/3 super-majorities in
both houses.68
The second, and most notorious, procedural opportunity to strip is
the Senate filibuster, which presently requires a 3/5 supermajority (60
out of 100 members) to end debate and bring a matter to floor vote.69
The filibuster essentially imposes a supermajority requirement in at least
one house for passage of any controversial or high-profile rights-creating
legislation.70 In other words, it allows a minority in the Senate to strip
65
See U.S. CONST. art. I; id. art. II, § 3; Kesavan & Sidak, supra note ___, at 52-53 (describing
evolution of modern Presidents seizing legislative initiative and the view of some in Congress that
its role is not to start from scratch, but to work over what the President drafts); see, e.g., LOEVY,
supra note ___, at 29-32 (describing process of drafting and lobbying for the initial Kennedy White
House omnibus proposal for what became the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Gueron, supra note ___, at
1204 (describing competing, polar initial proposals by the Republican President and Democratic
Congress in the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
66
McNollGast, supra note ___, at 17.
67
See ESKRIDGE, supra note ___, at 22; see also id. (describing support for Senate version of
1964 Act by House Democratic leaders, who knew that failure to adopt the Senate bill in full would
require a House-Senate Conference, adding further delay); LOEVY, supra note ___, at 307 (stating
that Senate amendments to the civil rights bill had been fully accepted by House leadership before
the bill passed the Senate); Rodriguez & Weingast, New Perspectives, supra note ___, at 1471
(stating that Senate supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were careful to limit changes to those
that would be acceptable to the House).
68
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7; Delahunty & Yoo, supra note ___, at 119 (“Because of the high
transaction costs involved merely in securing majorities in each House of a bicameral legislature—
let alone two-thirds supermajorities in each—the President’s veto power enables him to wield
enormous influence over the legislative process . . .”); Kesavan & Sidak, supra note ___, at 39
(“[T]he President's recommendation is a sort of veto-an embryonic veto warning Congress not to
present the President with legislation that does not comport with the President's legislative agenda
unless Congress can muster a requisite two-thirds supermajority in each House of Congress.”);
McNollGast, supra note ___, at 17 (“Unless Congress is sufficiently united to override a
presidential veto, the threat of a veto constitutes an important check on the content of legislation.
[It] induces members of Congress to take presidential preferences into consideration when writing
legislation.”); see also LOEVY, supra note ___, at 324 (discussing the differences in scope and
strength of the civil rights bill that President Johnson obtained in 1964 as opposed to what President
Kennedy might have obtained); id. at 322 (quoting MERLE MILLER, LYNDON: AN ORAL BIOGRAPHY
307 (1980)) (“Kennedy, faced with possible Senate opposition, would almost surely have
compromised somewhere, . . . . Lyndon refused to delete, refused to compromise, anywhere.”).
69
See Standing Rules of the Senate, No. 108-15, Rule XXII (2005); ESKRIDGE, supra note
___, at 6 & n.c; Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 182
(1997).
70
See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note ___, at 215 (“The widespread use of filibusters or
threats of filibusters has effectively increased the number of votes it takes to enact legislation from
fifty-one (or fifty plus the vice president’s vote) to sixty.”); Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox, supra
note ___, at 70 (“All major legislation addressing fundamental problems must overcome a filibuster;
to be meaningful, this legislation must represent a major change in the status quo.”); see also
Rodriguez & Weingast, New Perspectives, supra note ___, at 1464 (arguing that a de facto
supermajority often is needed in the House to avoid the block of a committee).
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even a right favored by the President and smaller majorities in both
houses.71 The filibuster stripped, or substantially weakened, arguably the
point of a strip, civil rights measures prior to 1964.72 Most famous of
these is Sen. Strom Thurmond’s record 24-hour, 18-minute filibuster in
1957.73 Much of the history of the 1964 Act focuses on the defeat of two
Senate filibusters (one lasting 15 days, the other an unequaled 58 days),
the first time a civil-rights filibuster had been defeated.74
Strips also may result from the efforts of the fourth actor in the
legislative process: outside lobbying and interest groups.75 One unique
interest group in the process is the Judicial Conference of the United
States, the voice of the federal judiciary advising Congress on legislative
matters.76
Because the federal judiciary provides the primary
adjudicative forum for these newly created rights, its voice weighs on the
initial decision to create rights, particularly with regard to the impact a
new cause of action likely will have on the courts’ docket and
workload.77 This lobbying tends to go in only one direction, however—
towards a strip of the rights that Congress (or some in Congress) wants
to establish. As Judith Resnik argues, the
underlying assumption of the impact process is that
increasing filings are at best a ‘problem’ to be mediated;
the impact statements are not elaborations of the benefits
generated by causes of action but rather of the
bureaucratic difficulties that new legislation could pose
for judges.78
The Judicial Conference’s views about the scope of substantive
federal law have evolved in the same direction as judicial doctrine.79
The Conference supported both the public accommodations and equal
71

See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note ___, at 182.
See LOEVY, supra note ___, at 7; Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note ___, at 199; Zietlow,
supra note ___, at 960-61; supra note ___.
73
See NADINE COHODAS, STROM THURMOND AND THE POLITICS OF SOUTHERN CHANGE 294300 (1993); LOEVY, supra note ___, at 130.
74
See ESKRIDGE, supra note ___, at 17-22; LOEVY, supra note ___, at 182-85, 281-86;
WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note ___, at 124-84; Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note ___, at 199-200;
Rodriguez & Weingast, New Perspectives, supra note ___, at 1423-24; see also LOEVY, supra note
___, at 286 (stating that this was the first time in Senate history that cloture had been invoked on a
civil rights bill); WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note ___, at 148 (same).
75
See Eskridge, supra note ___, at 359-60 (“Interest groups are important because they bring
issues to the attention of Congress, and because they are capable of maintaining issues on the
national agenda and blocking legislative initiatives.”).
76
See Resnik, Federal Courts, supra note ___, at 2616 (“The federal judiciary has had a long
history of advising Congress on a variety of topics and specifically on what the boundaries of
federal court jurisdiction should be.”); see also Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note ___, at 978
(“While the idea that jurisdictional issues were ‘basic policy . . . for Congress to decide’ remained
for som judges, the Conference proferred its views on some bills plainly concerned with such basic
policy.”).
77
See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note ___, at 978; Resnik, Federal Courts, supra note ___,
at 2618.
78
Resnik, Federal Courts, supra note ___, at 2618.
79
Id. at 2621 (arguing that the federal judiciary first complained and argued against the
federalization of crimes, then imposed the same limits as matters of constitutional law); infra notes
___ and accompanying text.
72
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employment opportunity provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
recognizing that more cases may be brought in federal court, but that it
would not impose an unreasonable burden. Thirty years later, the
Conference warned only of the negative workload impact of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (“VAWA”).80 VAWA created a
right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender,
enforceable by a private civil action in federal or state court by the
injured person for damages and other relief. 81 The bill was under
congressional consideration for several years, during which the federal
judiciary provided substantial input, predicting a litigation explosion of
more than 13,000 federal-court actions.82 Then-Chief Justice Rehnquist
came out against the new cause of action and the Judicial Conference
initially opposed, then took no position, on the new right.83
The institutional lobbying on VAWA mirrors the judiciary’s recent
overall opposition to any new federal causes of action.84 This was
reflected in the 1995 Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, which
decried the loss of “judicial federalism” resulting from Congress
“’federalizing’ crimes previously prosecuted in state courts and creating
new federal causes of action over matters previously resolved in state
courts.”85 The Conference echoed the Chief Justice in urging Congress to
“exercise restraint” in enacting legislation creating federal rights.86
2. Legislating Narrowly
A second, related way that Congress merits strips is by legislating
more narrowly than the constitutional and political baseline would have
allowed, creating rights and imposing duties, but narrower than they
might have been. Oliver Wendell Holmes recognized that “the limits
contemplated for the coverage of a statute are as significant a part of its
purpose as is its affirmative thrust.”87 Those limits reflect the degree to
which Congress has stripped the scope of the statutory right.
a. Ex Ante Strips

80

Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108 Stat. 1941-42 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 13981(b), (c), (e)(3).
See Resnik, Federal Courts, supra note ___, at 2618-19; Resnik, History, supra note ___, at
224 n.194.
83
See Resnik, Federal Courts, supra note ___, at 2618-19 & n.170; Resnik, History, supra
note ___, at 224 n.194.
84
Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note ___, at 1020 (“[A]s a lobbying organization, the federal
judiciary has chosen to oppose the creation of new federal rights . . .”); see Resnik, Federal Courts,
supra note ___, at 2618 (describing lobbying “against new (and unspecified) federal rights creation,
accompanied by federal question jurisdiction”).
85
Judicial Conference of the United States, Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, reprinted
in 166 F.R.D. 49, 82 (1995); Resnik, Federal Courts, supra note ___, at 2620-21.
86
See Long Range Plan, 166 F.R.D. at 88-89; 1991 Year End Report—138 Cong. Rec. S44301 (1992); Resnik, Federal Courts, supra note ___, at 2620-21 (“The Plan counsels against the
creation of new federal civil rights and raises the possibility of retreat from some of the
jurisdictional grants already given.”).
87
Bator, supra note ___, at 633.
81
82
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Congress can limit a statutory right ex ante, at the time of its
creation. This often is a product of the legislative process, because one
way around a veto-gate is to amend and compromise, narrowing the
rights created to minimize objections.88 Legislative opponents often
seek not to defeat a measure at these hurdles, but to weaken it, perhaps
enough to render any rights created meaningless.89 This arguably is
what happened with the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960.90 What
many argue made the 1964 Act unique as an example of rights-creating
legislation was the refusal of civil rights activists and their supporters to
compromise as to the scope of the new rights and their ultimate success
in getting the legislation they wanted.91
But some of the rights created by the 1964 Act were stripped in this
sense, notably in the employment-discrimination provisions of Title
VII.92 That provision prohibits discrimination in the terms and
conditions of hiring and employment because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.93 But the right protects only employees, not
independent contractors.94 It limits “employers” on whom the duty not
to discriminate is imposed to any “person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen employees for each working day”
over a period of time.95
It prohibits covered employers from
discriminating on numerous bases, but not, for example, sexual
orientation96 or political affiliation.97
88

See Staszewski, Rejecting, supra note ___, at 462.
See Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox, supra note ___, at 19 (arguing that “compromise
entails leaving controversial provisions out” or “specifically limiting the impact of the policy in
ways that appease pivotal moderates”).
90
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
91
See LOEVY, supra note ___, at 324-25 (“Any new law which would have satisfied the
demands of black Americans and their committed white allies could not have been remotely
acceptable to Southern whites. . . . Since no compromise was possible, a fight to the finish was the
only possible outcome for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and such a fight to the finish was what
occurred.”); but see Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox, supra note ___, at 24 (arguing that this
common view devalues the pivotal role played by Republican moderates, whose assent was essential
to overcoming Senate filibuster); Rodriguez & Weingast, New Perspectives, supra note ___, at 1467
(arguing “it was the Republicans who forced a compromise on the moderate version of the bill,
rather than the Democrats compelling Republicans to acquiesce in a stronger bill than they
wanted”).
92
42 U.S.C. § 2000e; see also LOEVY, supra note ___, at 65 (describing addition of fair
employment practice provision in House subcommittee); Rodriguez & Weingast, New Perspectives,
supra note ___, at 1467-68 (same).
93
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
94
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (“The term ‘employee’ means an individual employed by an
employer . . .”); Farlow v. Wachovia Bank of N.C., N.A., 259 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir. 2001)
(affirming grant of summary judgment because plaintiff was independent contractor, thus not an
employee protected by the statute).
95
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). This limitation came about in two steps. Congress set the threshold
at 25 employees in 1964, then reduced it to 15 employees (in a merits expansion) in 1972. See
Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 644 n.2; see also Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 126 S. Ct.
1235, 1238-39 (2006) (holding that quantum-of-employee requirement is an element of the
plaintiff’s claim); Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 703 (making same argument).
96
See Bibby v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Because the
evidence produced by [the plaintiff]—and indeed, his very claim—indicated only that he was being
harassed on the basis of sexual orientation, rather than because of his sex, the District Court properly
determined that there was no cause of action under Title VII.”); but see Andrew Koppelman, Why
Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 203
(1994) (arguing that stigmatization of gays functions as part of a larger system of social control
based on gender).
89
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These limitations all reflect discretionary congressional choices as to
the breadth of the statutory right it created. Congress could, as a
constitutional matter, have protected independent contractors and others
who “work for” a company, even if not employers.98 Congress could
have prohibited discrimination on other bases, such as sexual orientation.
It also constitutionally could have reached all persons engaged in
industries affecting commerce, even those with fewer than twenty-five or
fifteen employees.99 Legislators imposed such limitations for a variety
of policy reasons—to keep the federal government and federal law away
from mom-and-pop operations in small communities or to avoid
imposing new federal duties on small businesses less able to bear the
costs of compliance.100 The narrower right likely was necessary to retain
support from moderate Republicans in Congress.101
Ex ante merits strips are similarly vulnerable to the criticism that
there has been no strip because Congress has not actually taken anything
away. It merely has declined to confer the full scope of rights that it
constitutionally and politically might have, a decision at the heart of its
institutional discretion. But recall that a merits strip occurs whenever
substantive rights fall or remain below some normative (if subjective)
baseline.102 The rights established in Title VII were stripped
(diminished) relative to the baseline of the reaches of Congress’s
constitutional powers.103 And they perhaps were stripped relative to
what the rights were expected or anticipated to become.
b. Ex Post Strips

97

See Eugene Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1155,
1188 (2005) (stating that government discrimination based on political affiliation is presumptively
unconstitutional, but most states do not prohibit it as to private entities).
98
Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (prohibiting race discrimination in the making and enforcing of
contracts); Danco, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 178 F.3d 8, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that
independent contractors could sue under § 1981 for discrimination in the contract of employment).
99
See Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 681-83, 690-91 (arguing that quantum-ofemployees element in Title VII represents a legislative policy choice); infra notes ___ and
accompanying text.
100
See 110 Cong. Rec. 13092 (1964) (statement of Sen. Cotton) (“[I]f we desire violence,
bitterness, and hatred among the races in this country, I suggest that we put the Federal Government
with a club into the livelihood of every small businessman . . .”); id. (arguing that Title VII “would
lead the Federal Government with all of its power, majesty and bureaucracy into the way of dealing
with a small businessman who can ill-afford to protect himself.”); but see id. at 13092 (statement of
Sen. Morse) (“I know of no reason why we should set small businessmen aside and say, ‘You can
continue discrimination with immunity.’”).
101
See id. at 13088 (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (emphasizing narrow reach of bill that
leaves 92 per cent of employers nationwide uncovered); Rodriguez & Weingast, New Perspectives,
supra note ___, at 1472-73 (describing the need to make the bill more palatable to pivotal moderate
Republicans, leading to amendments ameliorating impact of Title VII on American business).
102
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
103
We can look at limits on jurisdiction in much the same way. For example, Congress gave
district courts diversity jurisdiction, but imposed (or left in place) complete diversity and amount-incontroversy requirements, neither of which is required by Article III. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331;
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 267 (1806). By granting less jurisdiction than it
constitutionally might have, Congress and the courts affect a mild form of jurisdiction strip, a
limitation on federal jurisdiction below what it might have been. See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra
note ___, at 1016-17.
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Congress also can merits strip ex post through subsequent amending
legislation, after members have had an opportunity to see how courts
have interpreted and applied the statute and how the right has played out
in the real world.104 Congress may strip rights in response to
expansionist judicial interpretations, those that extend the act to cover
more circumstances or actors or to require those covered by the act to do
more than anticipated.105 A subsequent Congress may have different
policy preferences than the enacting Congress, to which interpreting
courts have not paid sufficient heed.106 Courts may have resolved
ambiguities in the original statute, ambiguities that were necessary for
the formation of the original enacting majority.107 Congress may now
want to resolve those ambiguities in a different direction.
Of course, it is difficult to determine the frequency or efficacy of
such stripping in response to judicial opinions. Some commentators
question whether Congress is capable of consistently monitoring and
reacting to the vast number of statutory-interpretation decisions.108 On
the other hand, a study by William Eskridge found that from 1967-1990,
Congress overrode an average of ten Supreme Court decisions per term,
with increasing frequency beginning in the mid-1970s.109 Importantly, it
is not necessary that “Congress” as a whole be able to monitor judicial
decisions;110 two other groups in the legislative process are able to
monitor and place overrides on the legislative agenda—outside interest
104

See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note ___, at 1020 (“Congress is then implicitly invited to
overrule or modify the courts’ decisions if Congress decided that they are wrong.”); Michael E.
Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Resonse to Supreme Court Statutory
Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 425 (1992) (“Thus, when the United States Supreme Court
interprets a federal statute in a manner repugnant to Congress, the latter may respond by
legislatively modifying the statute in accordance with its intentions.”); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights,
Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 121 (2001) (“[I]f
Congress believes that the courts have made a serious error in interpreting a federal statute,
Congress can amend it.”); see also W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (“In the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is
the master. It obviously has the power to correct our mistakes . . .”).
105
See Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox, supra note ___, at 34; Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity,
Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1392 (2005) (emphasizing the interpretive
importance of “legislative deal that brokered the statutory language as well as any background
norms against which the language came into being”).
106
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 390 (1991) (arguing that the policy expectations of the current
Congress and President may be more important to a court’s interpretation than those of the enacting
Congress).
107
See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2085, 2155 (2002) (arguing that statutory ambiguity may allow majorities to form, as members
vote for the bill thinking it means different things, and all willing to take their chances in the courts).
108
See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note ___, at 974 n.25 (“Congress is often too busy worrying
about new laws to spend its time supervising and revisiting judicial (mis)interpretations of the old
ones.”); Solimine & Walker, supra note ___, at 436 (describing as exaggerated the notion of a
constant interplay and reversal between Congress and the courts as to statutory meaning); Tyler,
supra note ___, at 1410 (“Congress is simply not equipped to react in the normal course to most
statutory interpretation decisions and [its] track record suggests that its attention to statutory
decisions is highly inconsistent.”).
109
Eskridge, supra note ___, at 338; id. (finding the rate of override of lower-court decisions
increased to an average of thirty-four per term beginning in 1975); see also Solimine & Walker,
supra note ___, at 451 & n.123 (finding that twenty-four statutory overrides occurred in the 1984-88
period).
110
See Solimine & Walker, supra note ___, at 438 (“[T]he extent to which Congress as a
whole is ignorant of Court decisions has probably been overstated.”).
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groups111 and congressional committees with increased staffs.112 At the
very least, Eskridge suggests, Congress has strong incentives to monitor
statutory decisions, particularly less controversial or high-profile
decisions from lower courts.113
Consider the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA).114
That statute was a deliberate congressional response to federal courts
hearing and resolving claims under the Sherman Act115 that involved
entirely foreign conduct and injuries, with no domestic impact.116 The
amended statute reflected a congressional statement “to American
exporters (and to firms doing business abroad) that the Sherman Act
does not prevent them from entering into business arrangements . . .
however anticompetitive, as long as those arrangements adversely affect
only foreign markets.”117 The amendment responded to concerns among
American business, one of the most successful organized interests when
it comes to seeking legislative overrides of judicial decisions,118 as to the
lack of clarity as to what international and foreign conduct would be
permitted under federal law.119
FTAIA merits strips, shrinking rights and duties imposed by the
Sherman Antitrust Act that had been judicially expanded beyond
congressional preferences. The stripping act sets a general rule that
federal antitrust laws “shall not apply” to trade or commerce with
foreign nations;120 in other words, actors have no federal right to be free
from restraints on foreign trade and there is no federal duty in foreign
trade to refrain from conduct that constitutes such a restraint. The statute
then excepts from the exception (in other words, leaves within the reach
111
See Eskridge, supra note ___, at 338 (“[O]rganized interest groups have proliferated,
producing more monitoring of judicial decisions that are then brought to Congress' attention.”); id.
at 359-60 (“Interest groups are important because they bring issues to the attention of Congress, and
because they are capable of maintaining issues on the national agenda and blocking legislative
initiatives.”); Solimine & Walker, supra note ___, at 452 (“For instance, interest groups are
cognizant of many statutory decisions (as reflected by amicus activity) and their pressure drives
some--though not all--responsive legislation.”); supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
112
See Eskridge, supra note ___, at 339 (“Because staffs are essential to monitoring judicial
decisions (often through interest group communications), organizing congressional hearings (a
virtual prerequisite for an override), and drafting committee reports and statutes, the dramatic
increases in staff levels enable Congress to respond to statutory decisions by the federal judiciary
more often.”); Solimine & Walker, supra note ___, at 438 (“Both the House and Senate are
decentralized institutions, and the actions of individual committees in both institutions may well
have an impact on the interaction between Court and Congress under some circumstances. For
example, the members and staffs of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees routinely monitor
the statutory decisions of the Court.”); id. at 451 (stating that a large number of override statutes
emerge from the Judiciary and Labor committees, suggesting that both function as important
legislative agenda-setters).
113
Eskridge, supra note ___, at 415-16.
114
15 U.S.C. § 6a.
115
15 U.S.C. § 1.
116
See United Phosporus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F. 3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003) (en
banc) (“[T]here has long been concern over over-reaching under our antitrust laws.”); see also H.R.
Rep. 97-686, 5-6, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2490-91 (1982) (describing inconsistency
among lower-courts as to quantum of domestic effects necessary for foreign business conduct to be
subject to Sherman Act and the business uncertainty created by those inconsistencies).
117
F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 160 (2005).
118
See Eskridge, supra note ___, at 348 (finding that twenty-six percent of overrides in the
survey were obtained by organized big business or labor interests); id. at
119
H.R. 97-686, at ___, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at ___ (legislative history)
120
15 U.S.C. § 6a(A); F.Hoffman-LaRoche, 542 U.S. at 158.
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of federal law) foreign conduct that would otherwise violate the Sherman
Act that has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on
domestic (other-than-foreign) trade or commerce.121 There thus remains
a federal right to be free from restraints on trade in foreign trade (and a
corresponding duty to refrain from such restraints), but that right is
narrower than it was prior to the FTAIA stripping enactment.
3. Stripping by Superseding Rights
Congress may strip rights created by and existing under common
law through superseding legislation. Common law rules exist at the
sufferance of the legislature, lasting only as long as the legislature
approves of the rules and the policy choices reflected in those rules.122
Legislation in derogation of common law rights is disfavored, as
reflected in courts’ demand for a clear statement of legislative intent to
repeal existing common law rules.123 So long as that intent is clear,
however, legislation altering, and stripping, the controlling rule is valid.
And the power of Congress to preempt state common law through
superseding federal statutory law lies at the heart of the Supremacy
Clause and Erie.124
a. Common Law Limits to Federal Rights

121
15 U.S.C. § 6a(B); F. Hoffman-LaRoche, 542 U.S. at 158. For a discussion of whether the
FTAIA should be understood as merits strip or a jurisdiction strip, see infra notes ___ and
accompanying text.
122
See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L. REV.
705, 709 (2004) (describing the “fairly obvious fact that the common law can be overridden by
legislation” because the common law “reflects a de facto legislative policy to leave certain fields of
the law unplowed by legislation”); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272 (1994)
(“In this country, legislation has come to supply the dominant means of legal ordering, and
circumspection has given way to greater deference to legislative judgments.”); GUIDO CALABRESI,
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 6 (1982) (“Courts, limited to honest interpretations of
these statutes and committed to legislative supremacy, soon enough began to give them the authority
they claimed for themselves.”).
123
See, e.g., Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Auth. v. Chesapeake and Potomac
Telephone Co., 464 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1983) (quoting Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch.) 603, 623 (1812)) (“It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that ‘[t]he
common law . . . ought not to be deemed repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear and
explicit for this purpose.’”) (alteration in the original); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 561 (1967)
(requiring strict construction of statutes in derogation of common law); John F. Manning, Continuity
and the Legislative Design, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1863, 1873 (2004) (arguing that “the canon
explicitly directs courts to resolve doubts against changes in the legal status quo”).
124
U.S. Const. art. VI (“The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof, . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938); see Siegel, supra note ___, at 1168 (“A striking number of the most
significant preemption cases of the last decade involve claims that federal law expressly or
impliedly preempts state common law causes of action . . .”). One prominent example of this is
ERISA, which has been held to completely preempt state law claims related to the provision of
health insurance. See, e.g., Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004); see also Andrew M.
Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Them in the
Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1168-69 (2006) (collecting examples of
federal law preempting state law causes of action); cf. Catherine Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble:
Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Reform, ___ DEPAUL L. REV. ___, ___ (2007)
(manuscript at 2-3) (describing practice of federal agencies using preambles in federal regulations to
displace competing or conflicting state common law).
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One way to merits strip is to leave in place common law defenses
that limit the reach of newly created rights. For example, the range of
potential defendants and conduct subject to suit and liability for
constitutional damages under § 1983 has been limited by the Court’s
conclusion that common law immunities existing in 1871—absolute
legislative, judicial, and prosecutorial, as well as qualified executive—
survived passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (of which § 1983
was a part).125 That conclusion rested on the general statutory language
and congressional silence as to pre-existing immunities, leading to the
conclusion that Congress did not intend, and thus did not, undo common
law or eliminate those immunities.126 Congress has made no move to
override those decisions and, in fact, has extended judicial immunity,
further narrowing legal rights and duties.127
A more recent and controversial example is the use of the common
law State Secrets Privilege to preclude constitutional and statutory
claims. That privilege generally functions as an “evidentiary rule that
permits the United States to ‘block discovery in a lawsuit of any
information that, if disclosed, would adversely affect national
security.’”128 But it often functions as a complete defense, requiring
dismissal of ordinary civil actions against the federal government and
federal officials in which, even though the plaintiff might prove her case
using non-privileged evidence, the very subject matter of the action is
deemed a state secret.129
In Edmonds, a woman was fired from her position as an FBI
translator after filing a series of complaints with supervisors and others
about security breaches and misconduct.130 She brought suit, alleging
violations of her First and Fifth Amendment rights and a violation of her
rights under the Privacy Act; the district court dismissed all her claims
under the State Secrets Privilege, holding that the very nature of her
125

See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976) (concluding that common law
prosecutorial immunity was well-settled and the same policy concerns justify applying that
immunity to § 1983); Scheur v. Rhodes, 413 U.S. 232, 247 (1974) (applying qualified immunity to
suits against state executive-branch officers); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (stating
that “[f]ew doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges
from liability for damages” and that this “settled principle of law” was not abolished by § 1983);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (rejecting the conclusion that “Congress-itself a
staunch advocate of legislative freedom-would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history
and reason” through the general language of § 1983); see also Siegel, supra note ___, at 1133 (“The
Court has, on a number of occasions expressly acknowledged that the immunity doctrines are
judge-extrapolated exceptions to categorical statutory text.”).
126
See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554-55 (“The immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role
is equally well established, and we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had
it wished to abolish the doctrine.”); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376 (same as to legislative immunity); see
also Siegel, supra note ___, at 1133 n.131 (“The complicated immunity doctrines that have emerged
over the last quarter-century serve as common law caveats to statutory exclamations.”).
127
In 1996, Congress amended § 1983 to extend judicial immunity to prohibit injunctions
against judges unless a declaratory judgment was obtained and violated first. See Pub. L. 104-317, §
309(c) (1996) codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“[E]xcept that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”).
128
Edmonds v. United States Dept. of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 71 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C.Cir.1983)).
129
Id. at 78 (quoting Kasza v. Browner, 133 F. 3d 1159, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 1998)).
130
Id. at 68-69.
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employment as an FBI translator and the events surrounding her
termination themselves constitute state secrets and could not be proven
or defended against without the use of privileged evidence.131 Whatever
constitutional or statutory rights plaintiff had in her job could not be
vindicated not because of the narrow scope of the rights themselves, but
because of the survival of that outside common law defense.132
b. Statutory Limits on Common Law Claims
From the other direction are situations in which Congress enacts a
law that limits the reach of pre-existing common law rights, as by
limiting the persons or circumstances to which common law applies.
Consider two similar examples.
The first is the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act of
2005.133 It prohibits civil actions, in state or federal court, against gun
sellers, manufacturers, and trade associations for damages or other
remedy for an injury resulting from a third person’s criminal or unlawful
use of a firearm.134 The purpose of the law is to stop states,
municipalities, and individuals from bringing tort claims against the
handgun industry arguing that the industry’s distribution of guns created
the “public nuisance” of handgun violence.135 The second is the
Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, colloquially,
the “cheeseburger bill.”136 This bill, which passed the House in October
2005 and was pending in the Senate, accorded similar protections to the
fast food industry from tort claims alleging that the high fat content in
fast food made it an unsafe product or caused obesity and other health
problems.137 The bill was a response to several lawsuits alleging
common law negligence and other torts against the food industry.138
131

Id. at 79 (discussing First Amendment claim); id. at 80 (discussing Fifth Amendment

claim).
132
The State Secrets Privilege has become an issue in a number of actions challenging the
National Security Agency’s warrantless surveillance program. See Hepting v. AT&T, ___ F. Supp.
2d ___, ___ (N.D. Cal. 2006) (slip op. at 35) (denying motion to dismiss action on grounds of state
secrets privilege).
133
Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7901 et seq.
134
15 U.S.C. §§ 7902, 7903(5)(A). The law leaves in place particular common law causes of
action, such as negligent entrustment, products liability, and breach of contract or warranty. Id. §
7902(5)(A)(i)-(v).
135
See David Kairys, Legislative Usurpation: The Early Practice and Constitutional
Repudiation of Legislative Intervention in Adjudication, 73 UMKC L. REV. 945, 948-49 (2005); 15
U.S.C. § 7901(b)(1).
136
Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. (2005)
(as passed by House of Representatives, October 19, 2005). The first-ever Cheeseburger Bill was
introduced in the House in 2003, with a corresponding, and more complex, bill in the Senate. See
Ausness, supra note ___, at 891-92. H.R. 554 mirrored the 2003 Senate bill.
137
See H.R. 554, 109th Cong. §§ 3, 4(5)(A) (prohibiting actions in federal or state court
“arising out of, or related to a person’s accumulated acts of consumption of a [defined fast food]
product and weight gain, obesity, or a health condition”). As with the handgun law, this bill leaves
in place actions in which the plaintiff can show reliance and proximate cause. Id. § 4(5)(B).
138
See, e.g., Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005) (reversing dismissal of
class action alleging violations of New York Consumer Protection Act and common law
negligence); William HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS MEDIA, AND
THE LITIGATION CRISIS179-80 (2004) (describing first, voluntarily dismissed lawsuit against fast
food chains for failing to disclose high fat content in food); Richard C. Ausness, Tell Me What You

Merits Stripping

- 23 –

Both bills work identical merits strips of extant common law rights
by interposing a substantive federal affirmative defense to the common
law claim for certain actors in certain situations, a defense that destroys
the plaintiff’s claim. Both grow out of congressional disapproval of how
real-world rights have been wielded in courts and a desire to limit the
scope of those rights.139 And both were explicitly made retroactive,
applying to and requiring dismissal of pending actions in state and
federal court.140
Several objections can be leveled against this sub-category of merits
strip. One objection is that such strips constitute legislative adjudication
of litigation disputes, violating constitutional separation of powers
between the judiciary and the legislature.141 According to David Kairys,
such a law does not reform tort law or the rules of manufacturer liability,
but “simply decide[s] pending cases” grounded in traditional tort
principles.142
But neither of these laws changes the result in a decided case.
Rather, they change the applicable law in future and pending cases, often
requiring dismissal or a defense victory. But this is what legislatures
do.143 Although we do not know ab initio how a particular nuisance suit
against Smith and Wesson or a negligence suit against McDonald’s
would turn out under pre-existing common law, such a suit obviously
fails under the applicable new statutes. Nor is application to pending
cases problematic. Congress may enact legislation that applies
retroactively in civil actions (that is, to conduct that antedates the statute,
including to cases filed prior to the statute’s enactment), so long as it
makes clear its intent to do so.144 Indeed, a retroactive law must be
applied in reviewing a judgment on appeal, even if that judgment
initially was entered under preexisting law.145 That being the case, there
is no problem with having them apply to cases still in the trial court that
had not yet proceeded to judgment.
A second constitutional concern is whether Congress possesses
substantive legislative power to enact the stripping legislation. But
Eat, and I Will Tell You Whom to Sue: Big Problems Ahead for “Big Food”?, 39 GA. L. REV. 839,
841-42 (2005) (same).
139
See 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(7) (finding that lawsuits against the gun industry “are based on
theories without foundation in hundreds of years of the common law and jurisprudence of the
United States and do not represent a bona fide expansion of the common law. The possible
sustaining of these actions by a maverick judicial officer or petit jury would expand civil liability in
a manner never contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, by Congress, or by the legislatures
of the several States.”); H.R. 554, 109th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (“[L]awsuits seeking to blame individual
food and beverage providers . . . are not only legally frivolous and economically damaging, but also
harmful to a healthy America.”).
140
See 15 U.S.C. § 7902(b); H.R. 554, 109th Cong. § 3(b).
141
See Kairys, supra note ___, at 948 (describing handgun law as having “the attributes of a
classic legislation usurpation of adjudication”); id. at 947 (arguing that the Framers’ repudiation of
state legislative interference with adjudication informs our understanding of separation of powers).
142
Id. at 948.
143
See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note ___, at 965 (“If the legislature changes the applicable
law, for example, judicial decisions obviously ought to reflect this fact.”).
144
See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994); see also Ferejohn & Kramer,
supra note ___, at 974 n.25 (arguing that Congress can change substantive law in response to
judicial decisions “even to the extent of making its changes retroactive”).
145
See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 226.
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Congress took care in both bills to establish constitutional bases for the
exercise of its power, highlighting the interstate commerce effects of
such lawsuits, as well as the concerns for individual constitutional
rights.146 Congress also made effect on commerce an element of the
statutory defense that the industry member must establish in order to
defeat the tort claim.147
Ultimately, objections to this type of strip reflect distrust of
legislatures. Kairys’s argument boils down to the view that legislatures
are at the mercy of powerful litigants who will ignore the litigation
process and send lobbyists into legislative halls seeking exemption from
legal rules that apply to everyone else and from which the less powerful
cannot gain similar immunity.148 The Landgraf Court recognized that
legislative politics “pose[] a risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive
legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or
individuals.149 That unfairness is overcome by requiring the legislature
to make its intent clear.150 This rule ensures that Congress will be
subject to any political repercussions should its legislative choice—
exempting an industry from ordinary tort liability—prove unpopular.
Perhaps Kairys is right that the handgun law or the cheeseburger bill
reflect unwise policy that “undercut[s] coherent and consistent rules and
sacrifice[s] basic fairness for the expediency of the well-connected.”151
But that tells us nothing about Congress’ power to merits strip, only
whether the strip is wise as a matter of public policy.
4. Interpreting and Applying Statutes
Determinations of the scope and reach of a rights-creating statute,
and thus the ability to strip that scope and reach, do not end with passage
in Congress. Congress does not and cannot anticipate every real-world
factual situation to which a statute will be applied in the future.152
Statutory meaning is a product of what William Eskridge calls the
“Court/Congress/President game,” in which each is part of a process by
which statutory policy is created and the policy preferences of each

146

See 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a) (setting out concerns for harm to interstate commerce resulting
from suits against handgun industry, as well as desire to protect individual Second Amendment
rights and separation of powers); H.R. 554, 109th Cong. § 2(a) (describing interstate commerce role
of food and beverage industries).
147
See 15 U.S.C. § 7903 (defining terms such as seller, manufacturer, and qualified product by
reference to interstate commerce); see infra notes ___ and accompanying text.
148
See Kairys, supra note ___, at 946 (describing concerns for “the resulting race of litigants
to the assemblies and unfairness to those who had little or no influence with the legislatures”); id. at
950 (expressing concern for floodgates opening for any industry able to muster legislative support to
respond to lawsuits with immunity bills, rather than meeting the substance of the lawsuit).
149
See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266.
150
Id. at 268 (“[A] requirement that Congress first make its intention clear helps ensure that
Congress itself has determined that the benefits of retroactivity outweigh the potential for disruption
or unfairness.”); id. at 272-73 (“Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively
considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable
price to pay for the countervailing benefits.”).
151
Kairys, supra note ___, at 950.
152
See Tyler, supra note ___, at 1404.
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affect that policy.153 A statute must not only be drafted, it also must be
interpreted, implemented, and applied to real-world situations, a
seamless process of making—broadly or narrowly—policy.154 But this
creates uncertainty as to the meaning of a provision, thus the opportunity
for rights to be stripped at later points in the lengthy and ongoing
process.
Sometimes this role for the other branches is deliberate and
explicit.155 Many statutes are drafted with the expectation that courts
will fill gaps through judicial common law reasoning and
decisionmaking.156 Others expressly await action by the President,
executive branch officers, or administrative agencies, through regulatory
rulemaking and enforcement decisions.157 Judicial and executive
interpretations of a statute are deemed as much a part of the legal rule as
the statutory text.158
a. Executive Interpretation
The President must “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”
to enforce the civil and criminal laws of the United States.159 The various
department and agency heads help the President carry out that
function.160 Exercise of this power necessarily demands executive
153
Eskridge, supra note ____, at 390; see Zeigler, supra note ___, at 120 (“All actors in this
process, whether legislative, administrative, or judicial, must work together to help achieve the
underlying goals of federal statutes.”).
154
See Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox, supra note ___, at 27 (“Statutory interpretation
represents a critical element in the process by which legislative policy takes shape.”); Zeigler, supra
note ___, at 120 (describing the “drafting, enactment, interpretation, and implementation of
legislation as a single, ongoing process”).
155
See SAGER, supra note ___, at 32 (defining “foundational statutes” reflecting a legislative
strategy of generality and incompleteness and relianced on the independent normative judgment of
the judiciary); Rosenkranz, supra note ___, at 2128-29 (defining “dynamic interpretive statutes” as
“those that hinge on the future actions of others to be given content”)
156
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 596 (1994) (Kenendy, J.,
concurring) (“The common-law method instated by the fair use provision of the copyright statute . .
. presumes that rules will emerge from the course of decisions.”); Nat’l Soc’y of Professional
Engineers, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (stating that the legislative history of the Sherman Act “makes
it perfectly clear that [Congress] expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by
drawing on common-law tradition”); see also SAGER, supra note ___, at 31 (arguing that the federal
courts have had to “create substantial bodies of law whose origins are the compact and somewhat
gnomic congressional utterances”).
157
See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 914 (2005) (“Executive actors often must interpret
the enactments Congress has charged them with enforcing and implementing.”); Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Nat’l Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (“If Congress has
explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”); Lawson & Moore, supra note ___, at
1286 (“If Congress passes a statute creating a regulatory scheme and delegating to the President
authority to implement it, then the President must interpret the statutory framework in deciding how
best to carry the law into effect.”).
158
See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284 (2001) (stating that one cannot separate
enforcement of a statute from enforcement of administrative regulations that authoritatively construe
the statute itself); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 112 (1989) (“A
rule of law that is the product of judicial interpretation of a vague, ambiguous, or incomplete
statutory provision is no less binding than a rule that is based on the plain meaning of a statute.”).
159
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of
Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1280 (1996).
160
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; compare Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2245, 2327 (2001) (arguing that delegations of power to executive branch officials, nominated
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statutory interpretation and determination of legislative meaning.161 For
example, the Attorney General is empowered to bring a civil action for
equitable relief or consent decree to halt a “pattern or practice of
conduct” by state and local law enforcement violating federal
constitutional rights.162 Before bringing such an action, of course, the
Attorney General must interpret § 14141, determining whether particular
conduct constitutes a prohibited “pattern or practice” of unconstitutional
conduct and what type of relief to seek. A narrow executive
understanding of those terms, as in an administrative politically less
committed to civil rights enforcement, would produce a reduction—a
strip—in the scope of the substantive rights Congress sought to
protect.163
The greater opportunity to strip comes through rulemaking and
enforcement in executive agencies. That power is enhanced by Chevron
deference, under which courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations
of statutes that a particular agency or official is authorized to
administer.164 By narrowly interpreting its statutory mandate, an
executive can strip the substantive rights created, and the duties imposed,
to conform to the direction of her (as opposed to the enacting Congress’)
policy preferences.165 But Chevron deference applies only where the
agency or official has been delegated authority to make rules and the
rules in question were promulgated in the exercise of that authority;
otherwise, the executive interpretation is entitled to respect “only to only
to the extent it has the ‘power to persuade.’”166

and removable by the President at will and subject to at least informal control, should be understood
“in some necessary and obvious way” as delegations to the President) with Kevin M. Stack, The
President’s Statutory Powers to Administer Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 322 (2006) (arguing for
a conception of an independent agency role when power is delegated to the agency head)..
161
See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 914 (2006) (“Executive actors often must interpret
the enactments Congress has charged them with enforcing and implementing.”); United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (“[A]gencies charged with applying a statute necessarily make all
sorts of interpretive choices.”); Lawson & Moore, supra note ___, at 1280 (arguing that the
President’s many powers, “require law interpretation and thus indirectly empower the President, in
contexts involving the exercise of those power, to interpret the laws”); id. at 1286 (“The process of
exercising the executive power often requires interpretation, as . . . the legislature . . . will [not]
always provide sufficient specificity to render such interpretation unnecessary.”); see also Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843 (“The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . .
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules . . .”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted; alterations in original).
162
See 42 U.S.C. § 14141; infra Part II.A.6.
163
See David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted
Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1241 (2005) (“[P]olitical realities have muted the law’s
potential reach.”).
164
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; Rosenkranz, supra note ___, at 2129; see also Kagan, supra note
___, at 2373-74 (“The assignment of policymaking functions . . . appropriately tracks political
accountability; and political accountability, within the gaps left by Congress, attaches to and resides
in choice by the President.”).
165
Chevron itself arose from a “[g]overnment-wide reexamination of regulatory burdens and
complexities” that President Reagan undertook upon taking office in 1981, with the goal of
narrowing the federal obligations and legal duties imposed on business and industry, and
correspondingly, narrowing the rights of those protected by certain regulations. See Chevron, 467
U.S. at 857 (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 16281 (1981)); Kagan, supra note ___, at 2374.
166
See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 914-15 (“Otherwise, the interpretation is ‘entitled to respect’
only to the extent it has the ‘power to persuade.’) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944)).
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The level of deference accorded executive interpretation may dictate
whether an executive merits strip succeeds or fails. For example, in
1994 the state of Oregon legalized physician-assisted suicide.167 In
response, in 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued an Interpretive
Rule declaring that assisting suicide is not a legitimate medical purpose
under the federal Controlled Substances Act168 and regulations passed
under the Act and that prescribing drugs for that purpose would violate
federal law.169 Such conduct would subject a physician to license
suspension as a matter of federal law, notwithstanding state-law
authorization for that administration of drugs.170
Oregon law affirmatively created a right in terminally ill patients to
die with dignity by receiving lethal doses of prescription drugs; the law
declared the right and granted physicians immunity from liability for
prescribing or dispensing drugs for this purpose, enabling the legal
exercise of the right.171 The federal Interpretive Rule attempted to strip
state-law rights by subjecting physicians to professional liability under
federal law, thereby disabling individuals from exercising those statecreated rights.172
The Supreme Court struck the Interpretive Rule, however, finding
that the Attorney General lacked statutory authority “to make a rule
declaring illegitimate a medical standard for care and treatment of
patients that is specifically authorized under state law.”173 This
ultimately is a question of which actor effects the strip and how.
Clearly, Congress could pass a rights-stripping federal statute prohibiting
the administration of drugs for purpose of assisting suicide, trumping
state-created rights.174 It also could delegate such power to the executive
branch. But the statutory silence in the Controlled Substances Act did
not permit the stripping interpretation that the executive unilaterally
imposed.175
b. Judicial Interpretation
167

See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 912; Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.800 et seq.
21 U.S.C. § 801.
169
66 Fed. Reg. 56608 (2001); see 21 U.S.C. § 829(a); 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a).
170
Id.
171
See Ore. Rev. Stat. § 127.805(1) (“An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has
been determined by the attending physician and consulting physician to be suffering from a terminal
disease, and who has voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die, may make a written request for
medication for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified manner.”); id. §
127.885 (immunizing administering physicians from civil, criminal, and professional liability); see
also Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 912-13 (describing statutory procedures under Oregon law).
172
See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 914 (“There is little dispute that the Interpretive Rule would
substantially disrupt the [Oregon] regime.”).
173
See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 916.
174
See U.S. CONST. art. VI. Assuming, of course, that the statute is within Congress’s
legislative power. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2198-99 (2005) (holding that federal
Controlled Substances Act could constitutionally regulate purely local cultivation and use of
marijuana for medicinal purposes, as permitted under state law); infra Part I.A.5.
175
See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 924 (“In the face of the CSA's silence on the practice of
medicine generally and its recognition of state regulation of the medical profession it is difficult to
defend the Attorney General's declaration that the statute impliedly criminalizes physician-assisted
suicide.”); see also Sunstein, supra note ___, at 316 (describing view that the executive branch
“may not engage in certain activities unless and until Congress has expressly authorized them to do
so.. The relevant choices must be made legislatively rather than bureaucratically.”).
168
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Courts often determine the meaning of legislative text through
canons, maxims, and rules of textual construction, “vital tools for
rendering statutory interpretation more determinative.”176 These are
presumptions and clear-statement rules, effectively making one
interpretation or application more likely than another, a result overcome
only by a clear textual statement that the opposite should occur.177
Clear-statement rules enable a judicial merits strip, by pushing a court to
adopt a narrower interpretation of ambiguous rights-creating language.
We examined one example of this with respect to the survival of
official immunities under § 1983, which the Court has based on
Congress’ failure explicitly to override pre-existing common law rules in
enacting § 1983.178 These decisions represent strips of substantive
statutory and constitutional rights through the imposition of judicially
formulated rules.179
Another example is the question of whether a State or State agency
is a “person” under particular federal statutes.180 In resolving that issue
under several different statutes, the Court has relied on “the ordinary rule
of statutory construction that if Congress intends to alter the ‘usual
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,’
it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute.’”181 Because the general word “person” does not provide a
sufficiently clear signal, states and state agencies cannot be named as
defendants or subject to liability.182 The clear-statement canon pushed
176
Rosenkranz, supra note ___, at 2148; see also Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of
Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84 MINN. L. REV. 199,
206 (1999) (“The canons are rules of thumb about statutory interpretation, and some of them are
based on judicially identified policies.”); Rosenkranz, supra note ___, at 2108 (arguing that
interpretive rules “go hand in hand with the substantive statutes of the legislatures”); Tyler, supra
note ___, at 1419 (“Many of the canons go a long way toward achieving predictability and
continuity in the statutory regime, and for this reason they hold an important place in our legal
tradition.”).
177
See Rosenkranz, supra note ___, at 2149; id. at 2097 (“Clear-statement rules . . . function as
default rules . . ., in the sense that Congress may avoid the effect of such rules and achieve the
desired result with an appropriately clear statement .”); see also Tyler, supra note ___, at 1420-21
(arguing that Congress should be familiar with the canons, which will allow it to anticipate how its
statutes will be interpreted and to cut that interpretation off ex ante).
178
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
179
See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note ___, at 1002 (adopting that description of official
immunity).
180
One example is the False Claims Act. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (imposing civil liability
upon “[a]ny person . . . who knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer of the
United States Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval”); id. §
3730(b)(1) (permitting action by private persons “for the person and for the United States
Government . . . in the name of the Government”); see also Vermont Agency of Natural Resources
v. United States ex rel Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768-69 (2000). A second example is 42 U.S.C. §
1983, the statutory vehicle for enforcing constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (prohibiting
conduct by “Every person”).
181
See Stevens, 529 U.S. at 787 (applying canon to False Claims Act); Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (applying canon to § 1983); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (holding that federal age discrimination statute did not apply to states
and state entities absent clear statement by Congress). A clear statement was particularly required
where a federal statute imposes new obligations on States or interferes with their historical
sovereignty. See Stevens, 529 U.S. at 780-81; Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461; Will, 491 U.S. at 65.
182
See Stevens, 529 U.S. at 787 (holding that states not persons under False Claims Act); Will,
491 U.S. at 66 (holding that states are not persons under § 1983); see also Karlan, supra note ___, at
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the Court into a merits strip—it compelled the narrow interpretation of
statutory language, in turn reducing the number of actors subject to a
statutory duty and the amount of conduct subject to the limitations of the
respective statutes. Whoever else could be sued or held liable for
conduct that violates the Constitution or the False Claims Act, states
could not be.
Again, Congress retains final say over the scope and meaning of the
law through its ability to amend the statute in response to a stripping
interpretation.183 Recent history suggests that Congress has not been
inclined to broaden a statutory right in response to a judicial strip of
those rights.184 That makes the Civil Rights Act of 1991185 so
noteworthy.
Congress amended several federal employmentdiscrimination statutes in order to re-expand statutory rights that had
been stripped by a series of narrow, arguably cramped, Supreme Court
statutory-interpretation decisions.186
5. Constitutional Invalidation
Courts can effect merits strips by invalidating statutes, and the rights
established, as unconstitutional. This category is a product of judicial
review and the unique judicial role in evaluating governmental conduct
against the norms of the Constitution.187 Such a strip occurs amid the
ongoing debate about constitutional interpretation, judicial review,
democracy, popular constitutionalism, and the supremacy of the

194 (“[N]othing in Will suggested that Congress would have lacked the power to include states
within § 1983’s purely corrective ambit.”); Rosenkranz, supra note ___, at 2122-23 (arguing that, if
Congress in § 1983 had specifically defined person to include states, the result in Will might have
been different); Howard M. Wasserman, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and John Doe Defendants: A Student
in Section 19983 Procedure, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 837 (2003) (arguing that Congress could
amend § 1983 to define persons as including States); but see Stevens, 529 U.S. at 788 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that the absence of a clear statement that the statute reaches
States allows the Court to avoid the constitutional issue of whether Congress could do so),
183
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
184
See Eskridge, supra note ___, at 386-87 (emphasizing fact that initial attempt to override
restrictive Supreme Court decisions in 1990 was vetoed by President George H.W. Bush and that
the decisions only were overridden in 1991 by a change in the political landscape and the
President’s abandonment of his opposition to the overriding legislation); Gueron, supra note ___, at
1232 (“[S]pecific political events in the autumn of 1991 helped to precipitate the Act’s passage.”).
185
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1072 (1991).
186
See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 250-51(1994) (discussing several Supreme
Court decisions that 1991 Act intended to overturn); Eskridge, supra note ___, at 333 & n.4 (listing
eleven Supreme Court decisions overridden by Act); compare, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 did not prohibit race discrimination
during the performance of a contract) with 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (redefining discrmination in making
and enforcing of contracts to prohibit discrimination in enforcement).
187
See SAGER, supra note ___, at 75 (“The judiciary is in the rough position of a quality
control inspector examining some product for defects.”); Michael Kent Curtis, Judicial Review and
Populism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 313, 316 (2003) (“Though Marbury v. Madison had its critics
at the time, most did not criticize the Court’s assertion of the power of judicial review.”); see also
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 435 (Alexander
Hamilton) (“A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. It
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act
proceeding from the legislative body.”).
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unelected judiciary.188 Courts can strip statutory rights on two
constitutional grounds—because the statute exceeds the internal
constraints on the powers of Congress as a legislative body of limited
and enumerated powers189 or because it runs afoul of external limitations
on permissible legislation, notably what Lawrence Sager calls “libertybearing provisions” of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment.190
a. Internal Limitations
Federalism concerns underlie the objection that statutes exceed
congressional power by regulating conduct that historically had been the
subject of state and local regulatory authority.191 There is scholarly
debate over judicial federalism and how vigorously courts should protect
federalism interests.192 But the Supreme Court has narrowly construed
188

See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 107 (2004) (describing how theories of constitutional review all come back to the
presence of judicial veto over popular views of constitutional meaning); id. at 253 (advocating
change in judicial attitudes about judicial review, under which Justices see themselves as
“responsible for interpreting the Constitution according to their best judgment, but with an
awareness that there is a higher authority out there with power to overturn their decisions”); SAGER,
supra note ___, at 5 (arguing that courts and judges disagree about their role in determining
constitutional meaning and that doctrine about the relationship between the courts and other
constitutional actors “appears to be in the midst of a seismic shift”); Curtis, supra note ___, at 319
(“Skepticism about judicial supremacy has its virtues. So does skepticism about a plan to eliminate
judicial review.”); Lawson & Moore, supra note ___, at 81 (“[T]o say that federal courts have the
power, or duty, to interpret the Constitution is not necessarily to say that they have the power to
interpret it independently of the views of other governmental actors.”) (emphasis in original);
Weinberg, supra note ___, 1400 (arguing that longstanding and continuing controversy over judicial
review is product of “our democratic and republican values, our respect for majorities, and the
traditional supremacy of legislation at common law”); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 784 (2002)
(“As a theoretical matter judicial review and judicial supremacy should be distinguished.”); id. at
845 (“In contests between different conceptions of rights, there are principled reasons for favoring
more rather than less democratic procedures for resolving the dispute.”).
189
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Every law enacted by Congress
must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution. ‘The powers of the
legislature are defined and limited . . .’”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 590 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the “well-known truth that the new Government would have
only the limited and enumerated powers found in the Constitution”); see also THE FEDERALIST No.
52, at 297 (James Madison).
190
See SAGER, supra note ___, at 3 (describing liberty-bearing provisions as those concerned
with limits on government behavior); Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure
of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998) (“Constitutional rights in our own
legal world are structured, not as shields around particular actions, but as shields against particular
rules.”) (emphasis in original); Curtis, supra note ___, at 315-16 (arguing that James Madison
emphasized judicial enforcement and guardianship of rights as way to make the Bill of Rights
effective); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 288 & n.278 (2000) (noting judicial enforcement as a basis for both
Thomas Jefferson and Madison to support a Bill of Rights); Weinberg, supra note ___, at 1404
(arguing that Marbury is about the establishment of judicial review of government misconduct).
191
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (expressing concern that Congress’ commerce power
“completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local authority”); id. at
620 (stating that limitations on the scope of Congress’ power under the Fourteenth Amendment “are
necessary to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating the Framers’ carefully crafted
balance of power between the States and the National Government”).
192
Compare Kramer, supra note ___, at 288 (“[T]here are areas in which the Court has
historically exercised no or virtually no effective review, of which patrolling the limits of
Congress’s power vis-à-vis the states has been the foremost example throughout our history.”) and
Herbet Wechsler, supra note ___, at 558 (“[T]he national political process in the United States—
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the scope of Congress’ lawmaking power, particularly its power to create
statutory civil rights and to impose duties on state and local
governments, when acting pursuant to its powers under the Commerce
Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.193 These merits strips
occur within, and are a product of, a federalist system of government.194
They uphold a distinct vision of constitutional structure by stripping
individual rights that Congress believed it had the power to preserve.195
If such substantive rights are to exist, it is for the states to enact them.196
A paradigmatic example is VAWA, which created an enforceable
statutory right to be free from “crimes of violence motivated by
gender,”197 which the Supreme Court invalidated in United States v.
Morrison.198 The case arose from a sexual assault on a state-university
campus; when the university imposed no meaningful punishment against
the alleged attacker, the victim brought a private action against him
under VAWA.199
The Court first held that VAWA exceeded Congress’ power under
the Commerce Clause200 because that power was focused on the
regulation of “economic activity” and Congress could not legislate
against the aggregate effects of entirely non-economic activity, such as
especially the role of the states in the composition and selection of the central government—is
intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on the domain of
the states.”) with Baker, supra note ___, at 972 (“Substantive judicial review of federalism issues is
necessary both to remind Congress of its own obligation to restrain itself, and to catch any
particularly egregious examples of federal overreaching . . .”) (citation omitted) and Baker &
Young, supra note ___, at 134 (“A state’s freedom from federal interference, like an individual’s
freedom from governmental restrictions on expression or private choices, is an essentially negative
freedom.”) (emphasis in original).
193
See Kramer, supra note ___, at 288 (“[T]he Court has apparently made protecting the states
from Congress one of its top priorities.”); Post & Siegel, supra note ___, at 484 (arguing that
federalism cases “present an account of our federal system in which there are large stretches of state
and municipal law free from federal interference”); Siegel, supra note ___, at 1153 (“[T]he Court
has shown its greatest sympathy for federalism doctrines that protect the states from litigation . . .”);
see also Colker & Brudney, supra note ___, at 88 (“[T]he Court’s aggressive incursions into federal
legislative affairs often appeared improper in hindsight.”); Curtis, supra note ___, at 352 (arguing
that courts have failed in the exercise of judicial review by striking down legislation even though a
strong argument could be made for its constitutionality); see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down Violence Against Women Act as invalid under both provisions);
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down Religious Freedom Restoration Act as
invalid under § 5); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); but see Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.
Ct. 2195, 2198-99 (2005) (holding that Congress could constitutionally regulate purely local
cultivation and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes).
194
See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note ___, at 980 (“[J]urisdictional arguments can, in a
federalist government, also be premised on an objection to the fact of federal—rather than state—
enforcement of that norm.”).
195
See Post & Siegel, supra note ___, at 502 (arguing that the Court’s vigorous protection of
federalism ignores the fact that “Americans now believe that a core function of the federal
government is to prohibit discrimination in the public and private sectors”); id. at 508 (arguing that
courts “must distinguish federal antidiscrimination legislation that is compatible with the proper role
of the federal government from that which is not”).
196
See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note ___, at 1004 (describing arguments that “certain
problems . . . belong to the states”); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000)
(expressing concern for Congress asserting authority to regulate “areas of traditional state
regulation”).
197
42 U.S.C. § 13981(b); supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
198
529 U.S. 598 (2000); supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
199
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-02. The federal government initiated a separate criminal
prosecution. See id.
200
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
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crimes of violence.201 The Court also concluded that VAWA exceeded
Congress’ § 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by
“appropriate legislation,”202 running afoul of the “time-honored principle
that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state
action.”203 By making directly liable private individuals who have
committed violent criminal acts motivated by gender bias, VAWA went
beyond Congress’ power to halt discrimination and misconduct by state
officials.204 The statute made no effort to regulate states or state actors
so as to fall within the § 5 power.205 Federal law directly regulating
purely private conduct lacks the “congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
that end” required for a law to constitute “appropriate legislation” under
§ 5.206
b. External Limitations
One obvious source of external limitations on congressional power is
the First Amendment.207 A right may be stripped by a judicial
determination that the rights-creating statute violated the freedom of
speech. Consider here Bartnicki v. Vopper.208

201
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613, 617-18; see also Colker & Brudney, supra note ___, at 115
(“The Court rewrote the Commerce Clause test . . . by emphasizing that the economic aspect of the
regulated activity was central to holdings in prior decisions . . .”). Congress retains a limited power
to prohibit employment-related gender-motivated violence, which likely would constitute sexual
harassment under Title VII, because details of employee relations are economic and thus within
even the narrower Commerce Clause power. See Post & Siegel, supra note ___, at 449.
202
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
203
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Estreicher &
Lemos, supra note ___, at 151 (“Rather than acting directly on state actors such as prosectors,
judges, policement, and caseworkers, Congress devised a way to help women overcome the effects
of state-sponsored bias by suing their attackers themselves.”); Post & Siegel, supra note ___, at 502
(“The Court reaches back to the nineteenth century . . . for the view that it would threaten the
‘balance of power between the States and the National Government’ for Congress to regulate the
conduct of private actors under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Valid legislation under § 5 must
have “congruence and proportionality” between the constitutional injury to be remedied and the
means adopted to that end. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625. A law directed at individuals rather than
a State or state actor, the Court seemed to suggest, could not be congruent and proportional. Id.
204
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625-26; see also Estreicher & Lemos, supra note ___, at 157
(arguing that the Court seized on the fact VAWA’s penalties were directed against private
individuals as the distinction that took it beyond the limits of § 5 power); Post & Siegel, supra note
___, at 475 (arguing that Morrison “intimate[s] that even properly ‘remedial’ Section 5 legislation
cannot ‘prohibit actions by private individuals’”); id. at 483 (arguing that Morrison presents a vision
of federal-state relations “which seemingly would prevent Congress from employing Section 5 to
regulate the conduct of private parties”).
205
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626 (emphasizing that VAWA imposed no liability or
consequence on any state officials who may have acted improperly in the case).
206
Id. at 625-26; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (establishing
congruence and proportionality standard as test for § 5 legislation); Colker & Brudney, supra note
___, at 104.
207
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 105
(1980) (“Virtually everyone agrees that the courts should be heavily involved in reviewing
impediments to free speech . . . .”); id. at 116 (“‘[S]trict review’ is always appropriate where free
expression is in issue.”); Wasserman, First Amendment Lochnerism, supra note ___, at ___ (arguing
that there has been the least structural controversy over the institution of judicial review in the First
Amendment context).
208
532 U.S. 514 (2001).
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That case involved a civil action for actual, statutory, and punitive
damages under a federal statute prohibiting the intentional disclosure of
the contents of wire, oral, or electronic communications where the
discloser knew or had reason to know the information was obtained
through an unlawful interception.209 The statute created a right,
protecting an individual’s interest in the privacy of her communications
and providing a remedy for the violation of that right.210
During the course of a high-profile and contentious teachers’ labor
dispute, two union officials had a telephone conversation in which one
said that if the school board failed to move from its hard-line position on
salary increases, the union was “gonna have to go to their, their homes . .
. To blow off their front porches, we’ll have to do some work on some of
those guys.”211 The call was intercepted by an unknown person and
passed along anonymously to one individual who in turned passed it to
several media outlets, which broadcast the contents of the
conversation.212
The Supreme Court held that a statutory claim for damages against
the second disseminator and the media was barred by the heightened
protection accorded publication of truthful information, lawfully
obtained, on a matter of public significance, which can be punished only
to serve a governmental need of the “highest order.”213 Because neither
defendant had been involved in the initial illegal interception, neither
could be subject to damages for subsequent publication when the
communication was passed to them.214 While recognizing a strong
government interest in protecting the privacy of the conversants, those
209

18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(c), 2520(c)(2).
See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526; see also e.g., S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 66 (1968),
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153 (describing statutory purpose as “protecting the
privacy” of communication); id. at 67 (“Every spoken word relating to each man’s personal marital,
religious, political, or commercial concerns can be intercepted by an unseen auditor and turned
against the speaker to the audience’s advantages.”); Electronic Communications Privacy Act:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1-2 (1986) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (discussing the impact
of new electronic communications “on our lives and our sense of privacy”); cf. Smolla, supra note
___, at 1103 (“There is indeed a whole lot a scannin’ goin’ [sic] on. People surreptitiously intercept,
record, and disclose the usual suspects for the usual reasons, in the perpetual parade of human
perfidy.”).
211
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518; Smolla, supra note ___, at 1113; Wasserman, First Amendment
Lochnerism, supra note ___, at 19; see also Smolla, supra note ___, at 1144 (describing Sopranos
talk of getting “’dese guys”).
212
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518; Smolla, supra note ___, at 1113; Wasserman, First Amendment
Lochnerism, supra note ___, at 19-20.
213
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527-28 (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103
(1979)) (“[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public
significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information,
absent a need . . . of the highest order.”); id. at 533-34 (“The enforcement of [the statute] implicates
the core purposes of the First Amendment because it imposes sanctions on the public of truthful
information of public concern.”); see also Wasserman, First Amendment Lochnerism, supra note
___, at 20.
214
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529-30; id. at 535 (“[A] stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to
remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.”); Smolla, supra
note ___, at 1116-17; Wasserman, First Amendment Lochnerism, supra note ___, at 20; but see
Boehner v. McDermott, 441 F.3d 1010, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that individual who
knowingly receives a tape of an intercepted communication aids and abets or participates in the
initial unlawful disclosure).
210
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“concerns gave way when balanced against the interest in publishing
matters of public importance,” the truthful information on matters of
public concern at the core of the freedom of speech.215
There is ambiguity in labeling a case such as Bartnicki a merits strip.
The case involved competing rights emanating from distinct sources of
positive law—the plaintiffs’ statutory privacy rights in their electronic,
wire, and oral communications against the defendants’ constitutional
free-speech right to publish truthful lawfully obtained information on a
matter of public concern. The Bartnicki Court stripped the statutory
right by enhancing the constitutional right through an expansive
interpretation and application.216
The Hohfeldian framework provides a more specific way of
understanding the case. The federal wiretap statute, a source of positive
law, created in the plaintiffs a privacy right against interception of
communications and imposed a corresponding duty in the defendants not
to intercept or disclose the contents of those communications. But the
First Amendment, a distinct source of positive law, created in the
defendants the right to publish information on a matter of public concern
that they lawfully obtained. The latter right, in turn, imposed a duty on
the government (federal or state) not to burden the defendants’ ability to
publish. Government could not impose on the defendants a statutory
duty to refrain from publishing or inflict legal punishment on them for
doing so. It could not grant plaintiffs the privacy right by coming to
their aid in the face of defendants’ conduct in disclosing the
recordings.217
c. Common Theme: Non-Existence as Law
Regardless of the constitutional basis for stripping a rights-creating
statute, a merits strip has occurred because of the effect of the Court’s
decision. We are in the same legal position as if the statute, and the
substantive rights created and duties imposed by the statute, never
existed—never had been brought into law. This follows from Matthew
Adler and Michael Dorf’s argument that most constitutional provisions
state what they call “existence” conditions for federal legislation—some
federal nonconstitutional law (such as a statute) exists as federal law
only if it satisfies that particular provision.218 If it is inconsistent with
some constitutional rule, it does not exist as law.219 This contrasts with
“application” conditions, which limit the legal force of nonconstitutional
215
See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533-34; Wasserman, First Amendment Lochnerism, supra note
___, at ___.
216
See Wasserman, First Amendment Lochnerism, supra note ___, at 23 (“[A]lthough the
Court continues to refuse to say categorically that truthful publication never can be punished, it has
yet to find any government interest of a sufficiently high order to justify punishing publication of
truthful, lawfully obtained information on a matter of public concern.”).
217
See Corbin, supra note ___, at 229; supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
218
Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial
Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1119-20 (2003) (“A constitutional provision is an existence condition
for that type of law if no proposition can be law of that type unless the provision is satisfied.”).
219
See id. at 1129 (describing the line as “the difference between law and nonlaw”).
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law as applied to some facts or circumstances, without invalidating the
entire legal provision (that is, removing the provision from status as
law).220 With application conditions, the underlying statute is valid, but
it cannot be enforced against certain conduct.
Adler and Dorf argue that Congress’ enumerated powers and most
provisions in the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment, function
as existence conditions.221 An invalid law—one that runs afoul of any of
these provisions—is not a law. For example, the question whether
Congress acted within the scope of the Commerce Clause in enacting a
statute depends on whether the law regulates classes of economic
activities that, in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate
commerce.222 Because VAWA regulated private, non-employmentrelated acts of gender-motivated violence, something that could not be
classified as economic activity, it did not and could not exist as federal
law. Similarly, the question under § 5 is whether the statute satisfied the
appropriate test for validity (by regulating state action), regardless of
whether the particular plaintiff had suffered any actual discrimination.223
Because VAWA was not constitutionally appropriate, it was not federal
law.
This characterization is less clear as to the First Amendment. On
one hand, individual rights function simply as “shields” that “deflect
weak and medium strength justifications but succumb to very strong
ones;” everyone wears a shield that knocks out all or many laws that
infringe the right to engage in particular conduct.224 On the other hand,
individual rights protect against infringing legal rules; judicial protection
of those rights entails judicial repeal or revision of constitutionally
defective rules.225 This is consistent with the Founders’ understanding of
“rights” as “expressing limits on the sorts of laws that Congress could
enact.”226 Congress lacks the power to enact a law that infringes on First
Amendment rights, thus any law that does is invalid—non-existent as
law.
Bartnicki illustrates the difficulty of characterizing the freedom of
speech. The Court at several points emphasized that its decision did not
threaten the validity of the wiretap law or the ban on unlawfully
intercepted communications, but only the propriety of the statute’s
application to the circumstances at issue—publication of truthful
information on a matter of public concern by someone uninvolved in the

220

See id. at 1119;
Id. at 1120, 1155.
222
See id. at 1152; id. at 1153 (arguing that it is easier for courts to police the bounds of
congressional power by looking to the predicate of regulation than attempting to characterize each
particular act subject to regulation).
223
See id. at 1154-55.
224
Id. at 1161-62; id. at 1165 (“The First Amendment provides some (albeit weak) protection
to particular speech-acts proscribed under content-neutral laws that may be valid in most
circumstances.”).
225
See id. at 1165-66.
226
Adler & Dorf, supra note ___, at 1168-69 (“[T]hey viewed the recitation of rights and the
enumeration of powers as mutually reinforcing checks that served the interest of limiting the reach
of government.”).
221
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initial illegal interception.227 That sounds like the First Amendment
functioning as a condition for proper application of the statute to the
instant defendants.
But existence conditions operate by functionally revising a statute.
The First Amendment essentially, if implicitly, redefined the antidisclosure rule to impose the Daily Mail principle as a stripping statutory
element.228
The redrafted statutory ban prohibited the knowing
disclosure of unlawfully intercepted information, except where that
information is truthful lawfully obtained information on a matter of
public concern. Thus stated, the defendants’ conduct in publishing the
recorded conversationwas not subject to a statutory ban because no such
ban existed or, in light of the First Amendment, constitutionally could
exist. Neither could the privacy rights established by that statute.
Finally, even if legislatively created rights are not at odds with
constitutionally created rights, necessitating a strip of one by the other,
the existence of rights from one source of positive law may produce a
strip of rights from another source. Pressure for the Civil Rights Act of
1964 peaked because, by 1963, the Court reached an impasse on the
central constitutional issue of whether the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited purely private discrimination in employment and public
accommodations.229 Unable to fully establish equality rights through the
courts, advocates pushed the issue into a different lawmaking forum-Congress.230
In turn, as Robert Post and Reva Siegel argue, the enactment of
substantial civil rights legislation in the 1960s prohibiting discrimination
by non-state actors reduced the pressure on the Court to liberalize the
state-action requirement.231 Because there was an alternative source of
law creating equality rights, the Court could (and did) narrow the scope
of constitutional rights (such as the Equal Protection Clause), “secure in

227
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 524-25 (2001) (“The constitutional question before
us concerns the validity of the statute as applied to the specific facts of these cases. . . . The only
question is whether the applications of these statutes in such circumstances violated the First
Amendment.”); id. at 533 (“[T]he outcome of these cases does not turn on whether [the statute] can
be enforced with respect to most violations of the statute without offending the First Amendment.”).
228
Id. at 527-28; supra notes ___ and accompanying text. The First Amendment strips tort law
in a similar manner. For example, the “actual malice” standard of New York Times redefines
defamation by constitutionally imposing a state-of-mind requirement that the plaintiff must prove in
order to prevail on her claim. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)
(imposing “federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual
malice’-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not”); Paul A. LeBel, Defamation and the First Amendment: The End of the Affair, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 779, 783 (1984) (arguing that “defamation is the first tort in which, as a federal
constitutional matter, wrongful conduct by the defendant has been made an essential element of the
plaintiff’s prima facie case”).
229
See Post & Siegel, supra note ___, at 497-98 (“Through out the 1960s the Court was under
intense pressure to relax the state action requirement for judicial enforcement of Section 1.”); see
also Goldstein, supra note ___, at 1100-01 (describing views of Justices as to reach of Fourteenth
Amendment).
230
Goldstein, supra note ___, at 1097 (arguing that, at the same time the Court reached a
constitutional impasse, the political branches commenced a “constitutional dialogue” that resulted in
a political resolution of the question); Post & Siegel, supra note ___, at 498 & n. 267.
231
See Post & Siegel, supra note ___, at 517-18.
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the belief that congressional legislation would provide relatively full
implementation of antidiscrimination norms.”232
6. Limiting enforcement processes
The scope and nature of substantive rights depend not only on the
content of the right, but also on the means and manner of enforcing it.233
Merits can be stripped when the formal right remains in place, but the
remedial machinery is constricted in a way that limits enforcement and
vindicationthereby diluting the value, of the right.234
Substantive rights generally are enforced through some or all of
three processes. First, the rights holder may initiate litigation, but only if
provided with a cause of action for damages, injunctions, or some other
relief—“something that says, in effect, ‘If someone violates your legal
right you can sue him for relief.’”235 Doctrine distinguishes rights,
causes of action, and remedies as independent elements.236 All three are
necessary for an individual to vindicate a right through litigation.237
Second, government can protect rights by initiating its own litigation,
both criminal prosecution and actions for civil remedy.238 Such
232
Id. at 518; see, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only intentional discrimination); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (holding that privately owned and operated utility company, although
subject to pervasive state regulation, was not a state actor bound by the Fourteenth Amendment).
233
See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 858 (1999) (“Rights are dependent on remedies not just for their application to the real world,
but for their scope, shape, and very existence.”); Zeigler, supra note ___, at 107 (“[T]he type of
remedy a person may obtain defines both the scope and meaning of the right.”).
234
See Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183,
185 (2003) (labeling this a “more insidious” way to strip civil rights); Rudovsky, supra note ___, at
1212 (“[T]he Court and Congress have effected a significant cutback in civil rights at the
operational level while avoiding the controversy that would be provoked by the direct abrogation of
. . . statutory rights.”).
235
Zeigler, supra note ___, at 108; see also William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private
Attorney General” Is—and Why it Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2146-47 (2004) [hereinafter
Rubenstein, Private Attorney General] (stating that Congress has included provisions for citizen
suits in most environmental statutes); see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (cause of action under Title
VII); 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (cause of action under VAWA); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (cause of action against
person acting “under color” of state law for conduct depriving a plaintiff of rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States).
236
See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) (distinguishing cause of action,
determining whether a plaintiff can invoke the power of the court, from remedy granted for any
violation); Zeigler, supra note ___, at 83-84.
237
See Zeigler, supra note ___, at 108 (“Plainly if you have no cause of action, you have no
right and no remedy.”); see also Levinson, supra note ___, at 884 (“”[T]he right may be shaped by
the nature of the remedy that will follow if the right is violated.”); Tracy A. Thomas, Congress’
Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 673, 688 (2001) (“[T]he remedy is
not just closely connected with the right, but rather, is an intrinsic part of the right itself.”); Zeigler,
supra note ___, at 678 (“Unless a duty can be enforced, it is not really a duty; it is only a voluntary
obligation that a person can fulfill or not at his whim.”).
238
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 242 (permitting initiation of criminal prosecution against persons
acting under color of state law who deprive individuals of rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United States); 28 U.S.C. § 14141 (empowering federal
government to initiate civil action for injunctive relief or consent decree against state and local
governments for patterns or practices violating constitutional rights); 42 U.S.C. § 1997a (same as to
‘egregious or flagrant conditions” in prisons and penal institutions); see also Karlan, supra note ___,
at 186 (“For the most part, the Court has left the political branches’ power to regulate relatively
unconstrained. That is, the Court assumes that Congress and the Executive can prohibit various
forms of primary conduct.”); see also, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala.. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
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centralized enforcement allows the government to bring the full weight
of its power and resources to bear in the most serious and important
cases.239 Third, executive officials and agencies enforce federal laws
(and the rights created by those laws) through agency investigation and
adjudication processes.240 Congress recently has enforced Spending
Clause enactments by empowering agencies to withhold federal funds
from a public or private recipient whose conduct violates statutory
requirements.241
As to statutory rights, choices as to manner of enforcement generally
rest with Congress and whether it wants the statutory right that it creates
enforced through private litigation.242 Sometimes it is clear from the
law’s text whether enforcement will be by private action, government
litigation, or some form of administrative enforcement.243 Other times,
courts infer the existence of a private cause of action from statutory
language, structure, and history.244 Other times, § 1983 provides a cause
of action vehicle through which another federal statute may be
enforced.245 Much depends on whether the statute can be said to create a
“right” in the individuals bringing the private action.246
356, 374 n.9 (2001) (emphasizing the power of the federal government to bring actions for damages
on behalf of injured individuals).
239
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759-60 (1999) (emphasizing significance of Federal
Government expending its own resources as “implicat[ing] a rule that the National government must
itself deem the case of sufficient importance to take action”); but see Karlan, supra note ___, at 194
(criticizing the equation of centralized federal enforcement with the importance of a case).
240
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § ___ (empowering National Labor Relations Board to investigate
violations of statutory labor rights);
241
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. and
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981)) (“[T]he typical remedy for state noncompliance with
federally imposed condition is . . . action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to the
State.”); see also, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(g) (providing, under Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act, for agency investigation and adjudication of statutory violations); id. § 1232g(f)
(providing for termination of funds upon a determination that recipient “is failing to comply
substantially with any requirement” and such compliance “cannot be secured by voluntary means”);
20 U.S.C. § 1682 (providing, under Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972, for termination of
federal funding to educational institutions for failure to comply with requirements of equal funding
of men’s and women’s programs); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (providing, under Title VI of Civil Rights
Act of 1964, for enforcement of prohibition on race discrimination through termination of funding
to particular program or portion of program); see also Karlan, supra note ___, at 199-200
(discussing connection between “novel administrative remedy” of withholding federal funds in
egregious cases and private enforceability of rights).
242
See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 278, 286 (2001) (“Like substantive federal law itself,
private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.”); id. at 286-87 (stating
that unless Congress provides it, a cause of action does not exist); see also Harrison, supra note ___,
at 2515 (“If Congress takes some injury that formerly entitled the victim to no legal remedy and
makes it legally actionable, disputes will come into court . . .”); Thomas, supra note ___, at 704
(recognizing that Congress has authority to dictate remedies for statutory rights, a power derived
from its authority to define the substantive statutory guarantee); see infra notes ___ and
accompanying text.
243
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (b)(8) (providing protection for federal employees who expose
wrongdoing); id. § 1221 (providing employee with right of action before Merit Systems Protection
Board, not federal court).
244
See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 288 & n.7 (beginning and ending analysis with text and
structure of statute).
245
City of Rancho Palos Verde v. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453, 1458 (2005) (citing Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980)) (stating that § 1983 authorizes suits to enforce individual rights
under federal statutes); Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 (“[P]laintiffs suing under § 1983 do not have the
burden of showing an intent to create a private remedy because § 1983 generally supplies a remedy
for the vindication of rights secured by federal statutes.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing
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Logically, more enforcement opportunities means greater
enforcement and protection of substantive rights and fewer enforcement
opportunities means less enforcement and protection of those rights.247
Legislative or judicial elimination of one enforcement mechanism strips
the underlying right.248 Even if alternative enforcement mechanisms are
expressly available and can be substituted,249 the amount and quality of
enforcement will not necessarily be the same. To say nothing of the
possibility that no substitutes are available or those substitutes are not as
effective as the private judicial remedy.250
Many commentators hold particular solicitude for private civil
litigation as the most important and necessary enforcement mechanism,
particularly with respect to civil rights laws.251 Executive-branch
enforcement may be less frequent, thus less effective, limited by staff
and resources, expertise in the substantive areas, and political will.252
Enforcement also is limited by the executive’s inherent enforcement

cause of action where action under color of law deprives an individual of rights secured by “the
Constitution and laws” of the United States).
246
See Rancho Palos Verde, 125 S. Ct. at 1458 (“[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate that the
federal statute creates an individually enforceable right in the class of beneficiaries to which he
belongs.”); Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 692 n.13
(1979) (“For a statute to create such private rights, its text must be ‘phrased in terms of the persons
benefited.”); Alexander, 532 U.S. at 288 (emphasizing the need for “rights-creating language” in the
statute); see also Karlan, supra note ___, at 198; compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“No person . . . shall .
. . be subjected to discrimination.”) with id. § 2000d-1 (providing that “[e]ach Federal department
and agency . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate” particular statutory provisions).
247
Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered; Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary,
36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 310 (1988) (arguing that giving litigants choice of forums for vindicating
rights offers a chance for maximizing rights by creating a competition between forums).
248
See Weinberg, supra note ___, at 1417 (arguing that Congress may close courthouse doors
by eliminating private cause of action and choosing to enforce national policy through criminal
prosecutions or injunction suits by the Attorney General); see also Rudovsky, supra note ___, at
1212 (“Not every remedy must be available in each case . . ., but the absence of any remedy . . . in a
significant number of cases will operate to deprive individuals of redress for injuries suffered . . .”).
249
See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 290 (“The express provision of one method of enforcing a
substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others.”); Zeigler, supra note ___, at
119 (describing view that “when a statute contains a comprehensive remedial scheme including an
integrated set of enforcement mechanisms, a court should presume that Congress deliberately
omitted any additional remedies”).
250
See Rudovsky, supra note ____, at 1254 (“Remedies have been restricted on the theory that
other remedies would be available, but in too many cases the Court has failed to adjust the remedial
scheme to ensure the viability of the substitution process.”); Weinberg, supra note ___, at 1428
(criticizing cases in which the alternative remedy is illusory).
251
See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969) (“It is consistent with the
broad purpose of the [Voting Rights] Act to allow the individual citizen standing to insure that his
city or county government complies . . .”); Karlan, supra note ___, at 186 (“Congress can vindicate
important public policy goals by empowering private individuals to bring suit.”); Siegel, supra note
___, at 1139 (arguing that “Congress appears to have made a concerted effort to develop private
civil rights litigation as an important mechanism for enforcing communal norms and making real
our commitment to civic equality”).
252
See Allen, 393 U.S. at 556 (“The Attorney General has a limited staff and often might be
unable to uncover quickly new regulations and enactments passed at the varying levels of state
government.”); Rubenstein, Private Attorney General, supra note ___, at 2149-50 (arguing that
public attorneys may be fewer in number, underfunded, less skilled, or prone to political pressures);
Rudovsky, supra note ___, at 1239 (“[E]ven where the administration is sympathetic to the goals of
[civil rights] statutes, scarcity of enforcement resources will lead to undeenforcement; where there is
hostility to the sttautes, enforcement can be almost nonexistent.”); id. at 1241 (arguing that political
realities have muted the potential reach of law empowering federal government to seek equitable
relief against state and local governments for violations of federal law).
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discretion.253 And it likely will be confined, legally or practically, to the
most egregious violations, leaving less egregious or less systemic
violations unremedied.254
We thus might characterize as a merits strip the Court’s recent, rigid
doctrine demanding greater congressional clarity and specificity before
finding a private right of action in a statute or before allowing private
enforcement of a statute via § 1983.255 We also might find a strip from
recent Eleventh Amendment/state sovereign immunity jurisprudence,
which requires “congruence and proportionality” between the
constitutional violation to be remedied and the statutory remedy in order
for a state to be subject to private civil actions under civil rights laws
enacted under Congress’ § 5 power.256 This narrows the circumstances in
which Congress can provide an individual statutory action for damages
against states and state entities for their misconduct.257 Both place
enforcement of federal rights entirely in the hands of the executive
branch, with the presumptive corresponding diminution in the amount
and scope of rights enforcement.258
Exclusive governmental enforcement also may run against a
President who, convinced of the unconstitutionality of some rightscreating provision, unilaterally declines to enforce (and orders the
executive department to decline to enforce) that right.259 The President’s
power of routine nonenforcement of federal law based on independent
253
See Dawn Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable
Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 9 (2000).
254
See Rudovsky, supra note ___, at 1254-55 (criticizing process that “addresses the most
egregious of . . . violations, but which denies compensatory damages in a significant portion of
cases”).
255
See Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002) (holding that Federal
Educational Rights and Privacy Act not enforceable under § 1983 because the act contains no rightscreating language); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that no private right
of action exists to enforce disparate-impact regulations under Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964);
see also Siegel, supra note ___, at 1121-22 (discussing cases addressing the “basic question of
whether a party who has suffered an acknowledged or assumed injury to a defined legal interest may
obtain relief under a particular cause of action” and the Court imposing roadblocks, strictures, and
limitations on the ability to retain relief); Weinberg, supra note ___, at 1408 (arguing that the
Supreme Court limits federal litigation when it fashions new limits to federal causes of action);
Zeigler, supra note ___, at 116 (arguing that “requiring clear evidence of congressional intent to
create a private right of action ensures that few will be found”).
256
Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001); Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 730-31 (1999) (“Congress may subject the States to private suits . . . . only if there is
‘compelling evidence’ that the States were required to surrender this power to Congress pursuant to
the constitutional design.”); see supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
257
See Karlan, supra note ___, at 195 (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment erects a
formalistic barrier to enforcing federal rights, but “if the Amendment has any bite, that bite cuts
deep into the heart” of private civil rights enforcement); Siegel, supra note ___, at 1153 (“[T]he
Court has reinvigorated the states’ immunity from lawsuits by private citizens in a myriad of
ways.”); see, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala.. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding no
proper abrogation under Americans With Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62 (2000) (same as to Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
258
See Karlan, supra note ___, at 200 (arguing that the “major effect of permitting only
federally initiated lawsuits is to decrease the total amount of enforcement of valid congressional
regulation”).
259
See Lawson & Moore, supra note ___, at 1310 (“Nonenforcement by definition extends
beyond the ordinary executive prerogative of prosecutorial discretion and constitutes a deliberate,
unfaithful failure to execute.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed . . .”).
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constitutional interpretation is itself the subject of some debate.260 But
the result (combined with the non-existence of a private right of action)
is the absence of any enforcement of, or remedy for violation of, a
federal right.
For example, the McCain Amendment to the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 prohibits the “cruel, degrading, and inhumane” treatment or
punishment of detainees in United States custody or control.261 This is a
rights-creating statute—it grants detainees the statutory right to certain
minimal levels of treatment and imposes on the United States a
corresponding duty to accord (at least) that minimal level of treatment
and not to engage in cruel, degrading, and inhumane punishment. In
signing the DTA (including the McCain Amendment) into law, President
George W. Bush issued a Presidential Signing Statement describing his
construction of the Act as not interfering with the President’s inherent
Article II powers as Executive and Commander in Chief.262
This statement indicated an intent to strip the merits of the rights
created through nonenforcement , at least to the extent the President, as
Commander in Chief, believed certain treatment of some detainees was
necessary.263 And no other enforcement mechanism exists. The Act
confers no express private right of and the Court in its present
260

Compare Lawson & Moore, supra note ___, at 1303 (arguing that a President has an
independent power to interpret the Constitution and to decline to enforce a statute that she
determines is unconstitutional, even though Congress, the courts, and prior presidents all determined
that it was constitutional) with Johnsen, supra note ___, at 14 (stating that “one approach to
presidential non-enforcement interprets the Constitution as requiring the President to execute acts of
Congress, unless directed otherwise by a court of law, even when the President believes a law
violates the Constitution”) with id. at 44 (arguing for “non-enforcement policy under which the
President would decline to enforce a law only when he is specially situated to provide a needed
check on an unconstitutional law and he can do so without threatening the constitutionally
prescribed lawmaking process”) with Presidential Authority To Decline To Execute
Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 199, ___ (1994) (memorandum of Assistant
Attorney General Walter Dellinger) (“As a general matter, if the President believes that the Court
would sustain a particular provision as constitutional, the President should execute the statute,
notwithstanding his own beliefs about the constitutional issue. If, however, the President, exercising
his independent judgment, determines both that a provision would violate the Constitution and that
it is probable that the Court would agree with him, the President has the authority to decline to
execute the statute.”) with Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Presidential
Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers Doctrine 1, available at
http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba_final_signing_statements_recommendationreport_7-24-06.pdf [hereinafter Report] (concluding that if the President believes part of a law is
unconstitutional, he should communicate such concerns to Congress prior to enactment and veto the
entire legislation); see also Lawrence G. Sager, Courting Disaster, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1361,
1366-68 (2005) [hereinafter Sager, Courting Disaster] (arguing that historical examples of
presidential constitutional nonenforcement in conflict with judicial constitutional interpretation
reflect “Beta” disputes, in which the Court found some practice constitutionally permissible and the
President disagrees).
261
Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739, § 1003 (2005), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 20000dd(a).
262
See President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the “Department of Defense,
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and
Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006”, Dec. 30, 2005, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html [hereinafter President’s
Statement] (stating that the executive branch would interpret the provision “relating to detainees, in
a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary
executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on
the judicial power”).
263
Cf. Dellinger Memorandum, supra note ___, at ___(“ Where the President believes that an
enactment unconstitutionally limits his powers, he has the authority to defend his office and decline
to abide by it, unless he is convinced that the Court would disagree with his assessment.”).
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jurisprudence is unlikely to infer one, there being no legislative
statements indicating an intent for private enforcement.264 The McCain
Amendment becomes little more than a hortatory statement that the
United States should not engage in cruel, inhumane, or degrading
treatment, subject to the whim of executive enforcement decisions. It
exists as a substantive right, but has been stripped through the
unlikelihood of meaningful enforcement.265
B. Stripping Constitutional Rights
A second positive source of substantive federal rights is the
Constitution, notably the liberty-bearing provisions of the Bill of Rights
and the Reconstruction Amendments.266 The language of these
provisions is sparse and quite broad—what exactly does “the freedom of
speech” or “equal protection of laws” mean?267 Determining meaning
demands interpretation of and expounding on the bare clauses by
someone—whether the courts,268 the popular branches of government,269
or the People themselves.270 In so expounding, they determine the scope
of the protection accorded. And they can, at times, strip these rights
through interpretations that narrow rights below the baseline.
a. Judicial Constitutional Interpretation
The courts most frequently and most directly strip constitutional
rights in the course of resolving civil actions seeking legal and equitable

264
Cf. President’s Statement, supra note ___ (stating that the executive branch would interpret
McCain Amendment as not creating a private right of action, in light of Alexander v. Sandoval);
supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
265
See Zeigler, supra note ___, at 105 (“[A] right without a remedy is not a legal right; it is
merely a hope or a wish. . . . Unless a duty can be enforced, it is not really a duty; it is only a
voluntary obligation that a person can fulfill or not at his whim.”) (alteration in original).
266
See SAGER, supra note ___, at 3.
267
See id. at 36 (calling these “very general ideas, ideas whose basic thrust and practical
extension have been the source of much disagreement”); see also David A. Strauss, Freedom of
Speech and the Common-Law Constitution, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE
MODERN ERA 33, 40 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (“[I]t is not obvious what
constitutes ‘the freedom of speech.’”); Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, supra note ___, at 1029
(“While there is obviously no consensus on the meaning of ‘the equal protection of the law,’ it has
long been recognized that the Equal Protection Clause embodies a principle that similarly situated
people should be treated alike and differently situated people should be treated differently.”).
268
SAGER, supra note ___, at 71.
269
See Lawson & Moore, supra note ___, at 1268 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of
the President to say what the law is, including the law embodied in the Federal Constitution.”);
Sager, Courting Disaster, supra note ___, at 1365 (“It is all but impossible to imagine a world
where nonjudicial actors like Congress were deprived of independent constitutional authority and/or
absolved of independent constitutional responsibility, or even a world in which Congress were, as a
practical matter, largely unconcerned with matters of constitutional substance.”); Whittington, supra
note ___, at 781.
270
See KRAMER, supra note ___, at 107 (“In a world of popular constitutionalism, government
officials are the regulated, not the regulators, and final interpretive authority rests with the people
themselves.”) (emphasis in original); Curtis, supra note ___, at 358 (arguing that First Amendment
ideas “have a long career in American history, but outside rather than inside the courts”).
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relief for violations of those rights.271 This is not to suggest that a strip
occurs whenever the rights-holder loses on a constitutional claim.272 But
judicial opinions often define the broad meaning of a constitutional
provision, which meaning will be applied to future conduct.273 If that
meaning falls below a baseline (wherever that admittedly subjective
baseline may be), the court has affected a strip. Consider decisions
imposing a heightened state of mind requirement on a constitutional
right274 or declaring that a particular class of expression per se falls
outside the protection of the First Amendment,275 or declaring that
homosexual conduct receives no protection from Fourteenth Amendment
due process.276
Moreover, we might label it a merits strip where a rights-creating
statute survives review against a rights-creating constitutional provision.
In the contest between rights-creating positive-law provisions, the
enhancing of one right necessarily means the stripping of the other. For
example, had the dissenters prevailed in Bartnicki v. Vopper,277 a statute
designed to create privacy rights in personal communications would
have prevailed, enhancing those federal rights.278 At the same time, such
a decision would have necessitated a narrower interpretation of the First
Amendment, stripping those rights. Upholding the statute still would
have served constitutional values, albeit different values.279
Finally, constitutional rights may be stripped pursuant to Lawrence
Sager’s “underenforcement thesis,” which holds that, given the
judiciary’s institutional limitations, most constitutional provisions are
left unenforced or less than fully enforced by the judicial branch.280
Recognizing the complex policy choices necessary to vindicate some
271
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (recognizing private right of action for damages for constitutional
violations by federal officers); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
272
See Bator, supra note ___, at 633 (“Even in the sphere of individual rights, it is misleading
to suppose that the rejection of a particular constitutional claim imports less fidelity to constitutional
values than its vindication.”).
273
See Karlan, supra note ___, at 185.
274
See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (holding that Fifteenth
Amendment violated only by actions motivated by discriminatory purpose); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (same as to Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection).
275
See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006) (holding that public employees
spealing pursuant to their official duties are not protected from employment discipline by the First
Amendment; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (affirming that obscene material
unprotected by First Amendment).
276
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, ___ (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003); see also William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT.
599, 607 (1999) [hereinafter Rubenstein, Superiority] (describing how Bowers, having eliminated
federal rights, forced gay-rights litigators to rely on state constitutional law, with some success).
277
532 U.S. 514 (2001).
278
Id. at 542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (describing Congress’ concern for privacy as
“inseparably bound up with the desire that personal conversations be frank and uninhibited, not
cramped by fears of clandestine surveillance and purposeful”); see supra notes ___ and
accompanying text.
279
See Bator, supra note ___, at 633 (arguing that separation of powers and federalism values,
themselves having constitutional status, are vindicated when a court upholds a criminal statute
against a First Amendment challenge); see also Smolla, supra note ___, at 1175 (“[B]alanced
measures are called for, and sometimes there is room in our constitutional system for a measure of
balance.”).
280
See SAGER, supra note ___, at 86-87, 94; Sager, Justice, supra note ___, at 430.
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rights and their institutional limitations, courts decline to recognize and
enforce those rights as a constitutional matter.281 By not vigorously
enforcing rights against most legislation and government conduct, courts
leave those rights functionally narrower than they might be.282
Underenforcement shifts the locus, and arguably the duty, of fuller
enforcement of constitutional rights to the political branches.283
Unfortunately, recent § 5 doctrine has entrenched the underenforcement
strip by narrowing the scope of congressional power to regulate certain
actors and conduct284 and its ability to subject states and state agencies to
private suit to enforce and vindicate otherwise valid federal rights.285
Congress was expected to bear primary responsibility for enforcing
Fourteenth Amendment rights.286 By constricting the enforcement
power, the Court strips those rights by constricting their congressional
enforcement.287
b. Political-Branch Constitutional Interpretation

281
See SAGER, supra note ___, at 83 (“The idea that the Constitution is and should be
judicially underenforced depends on institutional differences that favor popular political processes,
in important part on democratic grounds.”); Sager, Justice, supra note ___, at 420 (“[J]udicial
enforcement of the right to minimum welfare contemplated here is by a great order of magnitude
more ambitious, more exhaustive of choices that belong in the sphere of popular politics.”).
282
See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note ___, at 1035 (arguing that, rather than use the Equal
Protection clause ambitiously, the Justice have allocated the vast majority of what government does
into rational-basis review, which means leaving the conduct undisturbed); Sager, Justice, supra note
___, at 410 (“Our constitutional jurisprudence singles out comparatively few encounters between
the state and its citizens as matters of serious judicial concern.”); id. (arguing that beyond protection
for speech, religion, privacy, and some discrimination, “the attention of the constitutional judiciary
rapidly falls off”); Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, supra note ___, at 1028 (“[T]he rational basis
test is a judicially created doctrine that underenforces the relevant constitutional norms of equal
treatment and fundamental fairness based primarily on institutional concerns.”).
283
SAGER, supra note ___, at 102 (“[I]t follows that we should encourage and welcome the
assistance of other governmental actors in realizing more fully the Constitution’s aims.”); Sager,
Justice, supra note ___, at 421 (arguing that “government is obliged to energetically pursue the
effacement of injustice’s entrenched consequences”); see William W. Forbath, The New Deal
Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE LJ. 165, 176 (2001) (describing New Deal arguments that “citizens
had fundamental economic and social rights under the Constitution . . . and Congress, therefore, had
a duty to exercise its power to govern economic and social life in way that sought to secure those
rights”).
284
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (invalidating federal statute prohibiting
private, non-employment-related gender-motivated violence); supra notes ___ and accompanying
text.
285
See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); supra notes
___ and accompanying text.
286
See Colker & Brudney, supra note ___, at 130 (“[T]he historical evidence suggests that the
framers of Section 5 did not intend to limit the scope of Congress’s powers to situations that the
judiciary had already declared a violation of Section 1.”); Harrison, supra note ___, at 2522-23
(“These Amendments were designed to deal with situations in which recalcitrant state-level
majorities defy the national consensus; therefore they give to the political representative of the
national consensus the task of deciding how much additional enforcement is need.”); Post & Siegel,
supra note ___, at 504 (“No one at the time had the slightest doubt but that the antidiscrimination
statutes enacted by Congress during the 1960s were implementing the equality norms of Section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
287
See Colker & Brudney, supra note ___, at 131 (“The effect of the Court’s recent Section 5
jurisprudence, however, may be to eradicate Congress’s distinctive Section 5 role . . .”); Post &
Siegel, supra note ___, at 508 (arguing that analysis must distinguish between federal
antidiscrimination legislation that is compatible with the proper role of the federal government from
legislation which is not).
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If judicial underenforcement of constitutional rights shifts the locus
of enforcement to the political branches, it also shifts to them power to
strip. But constitutional merits stripping plays differently in the popular
branches. Their constitutional views are addressed through subconstitutional processes, dictating legislative and executive decisions
whether or not to enact, veto, or enforce subconstitutional law, such as
statutes.288 Several examples of statutory stripping can be explained as
products of narrow constitutional interpretations by the political
branches.
Most obviously, Congress should decline to enact (and the President
to sign) a rights-creating statute if its membership believes it lacks
constitutional power to enact that law or to regulate the conduct at
issue.289 This includes an understanding of the specific power on which
it enacts legislation and the scope of conduct regulable pursuant to that
power. Consider again the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which is widely
regarded as the paradigm of Congress taking an independent
constitutional lead.290 Opponents of the bill cited federalism arguments
as to the proper reach of the federal government into private business.291
And Congress debated whether, in preventing race discrimination in
privately owned businesses and private business interactions, it was
regulating interstate commerce under Article I or enforcing the terms of
the Fourteenth Amendment under § 5, a choice that affected the
understanding of the statute and of the underlying constitutional
issues.292 The Kennedy Administration weighed in with its own
288
See Sager, Courting Disaster, supra note ___, at 1365 (arguing that Congress and the
President use the federal Constitution for justification for their statutory decisions); see also
Johnsen, supra note ___, at 33 (“When presented with a free-standing provision that the President
interprets to be unconstitutional, the President's oath of office is best interpreted as requiring a veto.
There is no constitutional justification for the President to sign the bill and then refuse to enforce
it.”); Lawson & Moore, supra note ___, at 1302-04 (arguing that the President’s constitutional
views can be used to justify vetoes and enforcement decisions); Whittington, supra note ___, at 781
(“Congress . . . can be regarded as implicitly asserting an interpretation of its own constitutional
authority every time that it passes legislation.”).
289
See supra note ___ and accompanying text.
290
See Goldstein, supra note ___, at 1145-46 (“Ultimately, the Civil Rights Act of 1964
represented the culmination of a constitutional dialogue involving all three branches. . . . As the
Court divided regarding the propriety of recognizing a constitutional right to service in places of
public accommodation, Congress assessed and used its constitutional tools to confer such a right.”).
291
See LOEVY, supra note ___, at 160 (describing arguments by Southern congressmen that
the bill constituted “an unwarranted invasion by the United States Government of the property rights
of those Americans who owned restaurants, motels, and swimming pools and who ought to be
allowed to serve whomever they pleased” and “gave the United States government too much power
to interfere in state and local affairs”); Post & Siegel, supra note ___, at 490-91 (“The logic of
federalism . . . was thoroughly imbued with this concern about protecting the freedom to
discriminate in racial associations.”); see also, e.g., Debate (statement of Rep. Willis) (arguing that
the public accommodations provision “undertakes to order that from here on the 14th Amendment
shall mean that the private owner of a place of business, such as a restaurant and many others,
cannot choose his customers”); id. Debate (statement of Rep. Abernethy) (“An owner of property
should not be compelled to serve or entertain or otherwise accommodate anybody that he, the
owner, does not want to accommodate.”).
292
See Post & Siegel, supra note ___, at 494-95 (arguing that, although Congress relied on
both the Commerce Clause and § 5, and the Court ultimately upheld the law under the former, the
“substance of the controversy inhered in disputes about the norms and commitments that inhabit the
Equal Protection Clause”); see also Forbath, supra note ___, at 220 (arguing that New Dealers
rested the “fundamental rights” of the National Labor Relations Act on the Commerce Clause to
avoid conflict with the Court’s interpretations of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments).
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constitutional views as to the scope of the powers on which Congress
wished to rely.293 The President, as a legislative actor in this process,
engages in similar constitutional analysis at this point and should
(perhaps must) veto the bill if she believes it unconstitutional.294
Second, Congress often includes in its statutes, recently at the
Court’s insistence, “jurisdictional elements.” These are facts that must be
pled and proven by the plaintiff in each case, functioning as a nexus
between a piece of legislation and the specific constitutional power
under which Congress enacted that legislation and regulated the conduct
at issue.295 The jurisdictional element affects a strip by narrowing the
statutory rights and duties created.296 But Congress strips in deference to
recognized constitutional limitations on its own power.
For example, Congress could not legislate under the Commerce
Clause against conduct that does not affect, in some way, commerce.297
By including effect on commerce as an element of the statutory claim,298
Congress ensures that the statute, by its terms, cannot be applied to
conduct that does not affect commerce. In other words, the statute
cannot and will not be applied to conduct or actors that Congress could
not constitutionally regulate. This adds a constitutional dimension to
stripping-by-legislating narrowly. The Constitution is, in a sense,
“enforced” by narrowing the scope of the statute.299
Consider Title VII, which prohibits discrimination by “employers,”
then defines employer, in part, as a person engaged in “an industry
affecting commerce.”300 That limitation narrows the statute—the federal
right to be free from race discrimination in employment only extends to
those who are employed by companies engaged in industries affecting
commerce and the corresponding duty to refrain from discrimination
only binds entities engaged in industries affecting commerce. But it
ensures that Title VII, by its terms, will not reach conduct (for example,
instances of race discrimination in employment in non-commerce293
See LOEVY, supra note ___, at 49-51 (describing constitutional arguments by Attorney
General Robert Kennedy as to congressional power under both the Commerce Clause and § 5);
Goldstein, supra note ___, at 1106 (same).
294
See Johnsen, supra note ___, at 30 (“The lawmaking process allows the President
significant, uncontroversial methods of promoting the constitutionality of the laws. The President
may, and should, evaluate proposed legislation for constitutionality, work with Congress to cure any
defects, veto bills when Congress has been unresponsive, and even after enactment, urge Congress
to repeal unconstitutional provisions.”); Lawson & Moore, supra note ___, at 1289 (“[M]odern
scholars wonder whether the President must veto bills that contain provisions he deems
unconstitutional, but no one argues that the President is forbidden from issuing vetoes on
constitutional grounds.”) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
295
See Adler & Dorf, supra note ___, at 1153 (“Congress sometimes chooses to include in its
statutes a ‘jurisdictional nexus’—that is, a requirement that the government prove that the acts to
which a statute is applied in a given case themselves affect interstate commerce.”).
296
See supra Part I.A.1.a.
297
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995).
298
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (prohibiting contracts “in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States”); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting discrimination in employment by
employers engaged in a business affecting commerce); 15 U.S.C. § 7903 (defining statutory terms
of handgun-manufacturer defense in terms of engagement of person, seller, business, manufacturer,
and product by reference to interstate or foreign commerce).
299
See Adler & Dorf, supra note ___, at 1122.
300
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
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effecting industries, to the extent there is such a thing anymore) that
Congress could not constitutionally regulate.301
II. JURISDICTION, MERITS, AND STRIPS
Jurisdiction stripping and merits stripping both are means of
constraining the reach and scope of federal judicial activity and
influence.302 Both produce the apparently same effect—fewer successful
civil actions will be brought to vindicate federal individual rights,
arguably depriving courts of the opportunity to perform their central role
of protecting federal rights.303 There is a symbiotic relationship between
the two. Expansion of substantive rights carries with it an expansion of
judicial competence, while contraction of substantive rights means the
contraction of judicial competence.304 It is arguable that the various
legal rules identified as merits strips can, as Louise Weinberg suggests,
“loosely but realistically” be described as limits on judicial
jurisdiction.305
It makes no difference, the argument goes, whether we speak of
limits on causes of action or restrictions on jurisdiction.306 True enough,
if our focus is solely on effects on the federal docket. If the diminished
substantive right dissuades individuals from filing civil actions in the
first instance, knowing they cannot prevail on claims of a stripped right,
the federal docket shrinks.

301
See Adler & Dorf, supra note ___, at 1153 (“Whether the nexus is satisfied in particular
circumstances is a distinct question about the statute’s scope . . .”).
302
See Resnik, Federal Courts, supra note ___, at 2613 (“Jurisdictional grants, restrictions,
and decisional rules (be they case in terms of causes of action, removing categories of cases from
Article III oversight, . . . are the next template on which to examine court-Congress relations.”).
303
See REDISH, supra note ___, at 96 (“[T]oday the primary function of the federal courts is
generally thought to be the adjudication and protection of federal rights . . .”); Paul Mishkin, The
Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 157 (1953) (arguing that, with
the expansion of federal legislation in the 1960s, the exercise of power over federal claims
“constitutes one of the major purposes of a full independent system of national trial courts”); Judith
Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: Changing Contexts, Selective Memories, and
Limited Imaginations, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 171, 226-27 (1995) (describing federal claims as “the very
kind of jurisdiction that many today assume to be the quintessential federal moment”); Siegel, supra
note ___, at 1123 (criticizing Rehnquist Court decisions that “ignore[] or downplay[] . . . the
historic role of the federal courts in insuring that remedial schemes are sufficient to protect federal
rights”).
304
See Weinberg, supra note ___, at 1409-10 (arguing that the dockets of the federal courts
“swell whenever Congress enacts yet another new law giving rise to new federal rights”); see also
Resnik, Federal Courts, supra note ___, at 2593 (arguing that limitations on decision making by
Article III judges come, in part, from “cases not often characterized as ‘about’ Article III but
denominated as ‘about’ congressional commerce clause powers”).
305
Weinberg, supra note ___, at 1407; see Resnik, Federal Courts, supra note ___, at 2593
(describing range of enactments limiting “decision making opportunities” for federal courts).
306
See Resnik, Federal Courts, supra note ___, at 2593, 2613; Resnik, Trial as Error, supra
note ___, at 979 (describing objections to new causes of action through arguments about special
character and import of federal courts); Weinberg, supra note ___, at 1407-08; see also Ferejohn &
Kramer, supra note ___, at 1034 (“[I]t is far more typical for the Court to exercise jurisdiction while
applying substantive legal tests that leave political actors free to choose their course of action
without any realistic threat of judicial intercession.”); Siegel, supra note ___, at 1115 (discussing
Rehnquist Court’s hostility to litigation that “comes across as an overt inclination to close the courts
to particular kinds of claims or claimants, at other times as skepticism about doctrinal innovations
that might have the immediate or second-order consequence of facilitating litigation”).
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But the understanding changes when we shift our focus to two
distinct points. One is the effect that a strip has on real-world actors and
conduct, how individuals behave in light of narrower legal rights and
duties. A second is the effect on the litigation process, on how claims, if
they are brought to federal courts, will be resolved under the new legal
rules. With that change in focus, meaningful facial, practical, and
procedural differences emerge between merits stripping and jurisdiction
stripping. These differences demand that we avoid conflating the
concepts or using terms loosely.
The conflation of jurisdiction stripping and merits stripping is a
subset of the broader problematic conflation of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction and substantive merits in federal actions.307 Something
different occurs—conceptually, analytically, and procedurally—when
Congress or other legal rule makers create enforceable substantive rights
(and impose enforceable substantive duties) as opposed to granting
subject matter jurisdiction.308 It follows that something different occurs
when the strip is of the merits of substantive claims of right as opposed
to subject matter jurisdiction.
A. Common Principles
In distinguishing and separating merits stripping from jurisdiction
stripping, as with separating merits and jurisdiction, several common
principles guide our analysis.
1. Power Sources and Legal Pronouncements
Stripping, whether of jurisdiction or merits, represents an exercise of
legal rulemaking by some branch of government. But, at least with
strips of statutory rights, Congress tends to be the prime mover.
Most efforts at jurisdiction stripping originate with Congress in the
course of legislating the jurisdiction of the courts and the debate is the
extent to which the power to grant jurisdiction includes the power to
strip power over certain classes of cases.309 In addition, federal courts
often strip their own jurisdiction specifically to keep Congress from
attempting to exercise that power.310 Similarly, most efforts at merits
stripping originate with Congress or are affected by one of the other
branches in the course of reviewing, interpreting, and applying
congressional legislation.311

307

See generally Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 662-64.
Id. at 669-70.
See sources cited supra note ___.
310
See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note ___, at 1001 (“[T]he federal judiciary has also devised
an assortment of doctrinal principles that reduce the likelihood of politically judicial entanglement
in broad categories of cases.”); id. at 995 (“[T]he judiciary has acted in such a way that Congress
and the executive have seldom felt the need to [jurisdiction strip].”); see also Weinberg, supra note
___, at 1408 (“[A]t least since the demise of the Warren Court, the Supreme Court has been a
veritable fount of door-closing and access-limiting rules.”).
311
See supra Part I.
308
309
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Classifying a stripping act thus begins with a proper understanding
of the act of Congress that affects the strip or that the other branches are
responding to in affecting the strip.
The first step is to apply a proper framework of congressional
power, as suggested by John Harrison. He divides congressional power
into four categories, two structural and two substantive. Through its
structural powers, Congress determines the class of cases that the federal
courts are empowered to hear, including establishing subject matter
jurisdiction.312 Through its substantive powers, Congress creates,
declines to create, or limits causes of action, determining “who is
entitled to sue whom for what, and for what remedy.”313 Thus, to the
extent it can, Congress jurisdiction strips as an exercise of its structural
powers; it merits strips as an exercise of its substantive powers.
We can, in turn, characterize the stripping conduct of the executive
and judiciary according to the power source of the congressional
enactment to which either is responding. A narrow judicial
interpretation of a structural enactment (for example, the judicial gloss
on general federal question jurisdiction requiring that the plaintiff’s
claim be based on federal law as established in the “well-pleaded
complaint”314) affects a jurisdiction strip.315 A narrow judicial
interpretation of a substantive enactment affects a merits strip.316
The second step is to recognize distinct enactments produced by
distinct legislative powers, through a plain-language approach. A
jurisdiction-granting provision contains jurisdictional language; it is
addressed directly to the courts and speaks in jurisdictional terms about
the classes of cases that the federal courts are empowered to hear.317 A
substantive rights-granting provision contains language directed to realworld actors, speaking in terms of who is protected by the right, who is
subject to a duty, and the conduct that is permitted or restrained by the
provision.318
312

See Harrison, supra note ___, at 2514.
Id. at 2515; see Leonard, supra note ___, at 280 (describing Congress’s substantive
authority to legislate within its constitutional ambit, including the power to create or not creates
causes of action and to choose who may or may not enforce claims in court).
314
28 U.S.C. § 1331; Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936); Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
315
See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note ___, at 1019 (describing this as the “most prominent
judicially crafted limitation on federal question jurisdiction).
316
See supra Part I.A.4.
317
See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 (2006) (“If the Legislature clearly states
that a threshold limitation on a statute's scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants
will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue.”) (footnote omitted); Zipes v.
Trans World Airways, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982) (holding that provision is not jurisdiction
where it “does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the courts”);
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 344 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (calling jurisdictional
language “most salient characteristic”); United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942,
954 (7th Cir. 2003) (Wood, D., J., dissenting) (arguing that statute is not jurisdictional grant when it
does not speak in jurisdictional terms or even mention jurisdiction); see also Scott C. Idleman, The
Demise of Hypothetical Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 42 VAND. L. REV. 235, 324 n.366
(1999); Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 676.
318
See Harrison, supra note ___, at 2521 (arguing that a right is violated when conduct occurs
that is “inconsistent with a duty resting on the defendant”); Leonard, supra note ___, at 280;
Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note __, at 674-75; see also Hartford Ins. Co. v. California, 509
313
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The same distinctions that separate grants of jurisdiction from grants
of substantive rights separate strips of jurisdiction from strips of
substantive rights. We look to the same plain language markers to
decide whether a provision reduces judicial jurisdiction or real-world
rights. We also look to the same language to characterize an
interpretation of that provision by the courts or the executive.
Importantly, Congress’ substantive powers are broader and more
frequently exercised than its structural powers.319 Our default must be
that an enactment (or interpretation or application of an enactment) is
jurisdictional only if Congress provides a clear statement to that effect,
usually through jurisdictional language; otherwise, the provision should
be characterized as substantive and tied to the merits of a claim. The
Supreme Court adopted such an approach as to a statutory stripping
provision in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.320 In holding that the limitation on
Title VII to employees with 15 or more employees was substantive and
not jurisdictional, the Court stated:
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation
on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then
courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not
be left to wrestle with the issue. . . . But when Congress
does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as
jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as
nonjurisdictional in character.321
The imperative for a clear statement is even stronger where stripping
is involved, given the ongoing constitutional, structural, and policy
controversy over jurisdiction stripping.322 Absent clear, jurisdictionstripping language to the contrary, the default should be that what was
stripped was substantive rights, the merits, simply to avoid the nice
constitutional issue of the existence and scope of Congress’ jurisdictionstripping power.
2. Jurisdiction, Litigation, and Adjudication
Underlying the distinction between jurisdiction stripping and merits
stripping is a necessary distinction among three ideas: subject matter
jurisdiction, litigation, and adjudication.
Subject matter jurisdiction is the raw adjudicative power of the
courts, the authority to hear, decide, and resolve legal and factual
disputes brought before them in favor of one party or the other.323 It is, in
U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that questions of substantive law turn on
whether Congress asserted regulatory power over challenged conduct).
319
See Harrison, supra note ___, at 2514 (“Congress has considerably more discretion when
exercising substantive rather than structural power.”).
320
126 S. Ct. 1235 (2005).
321
Id. at 1245; see Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 693.
322
See sources cited supra note ___.
323
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714(2004) (defining jurisdiction as
“addressing the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned with a certain subject”); Davis v.
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Lawrence Sager’s words, the “motive force of a court, the root power to
adjudicate a specified set of controversies.”324
Litigation is the broad process of judicial dispute resolution. The
concept includes within it decisions by particular individuals or groups
to resolve problems and to seek redress through formal application to the
courts, as well as a complex of individuals, institutions, and practices
through which such disputes are resolved.325 Litigation is a three-stage
process, with procedural issues such as subject matter jurisdiction
resolved at the first stage and merits issues resolved in stages two and
three; the identity of the decision maker and the manner of decision
making vary among the issues and stages.326 The end goal of litigation is
a trial, frequently with a jury acting as factfinder for any disputes of fact
going to the merits (even if most cases are, in fact, resolved or settled
long before trial).327
Adjudication is the method of decision making as to all legal and
factual issues in the litigation process, whether merits, jurisdictional, or
procedural, and at any stage of the litigation process.328 Adjudication is
characterized by party participation, the opportunity to present proofs,
and reasoned and explained decisions.329
By diminishing the scope of real-world rights and duties and the
ability to enforce those rights and impose those duties, merits strips
reduce the amount of federal litigation (or, from the plaintiff’s
standpoint, the amount of successful litigation). But a change in the
amount of litigation does not equate to a change in the amount of federal
jurisdiction, of raw adjudicative authority.
District courts assert adjudicative power over most federal claims
under the grant of general federal-question jurisdiction over claims
“arising under” the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States.330 Arising under, for statutory purposes, generally means that the
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) (defining jurisdiction as “a question of whether a federal
court has the power, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, to hear a case . . .”);
Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S. 528, 538 (1974) (defining jurisdiction as “essentially the authority
conferred by Congress to decide a given type of case one way or the other”); Lee, supra note ___, at
1620 (defining jurisdiction as “legitimate authority”).
324
Sager, Constitutional Limitations, supra note ___, at 22.
325
Siegel, supra note ___, at 1114.
326
See Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 649-55.
327
Id. at 648, 654-55.
328
See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note ___, at 928 (defining adjudication as
“decisionmaking by a judge”); Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 649 (arguing that
adjudication requires a certain process be followed in deciding whatever issues are in dispute
between the parties).
329
See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 369
(1978); Owen M. Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (1979); Chad M.
Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the Duty to Decide, 94 GEO.
L.J. 121,153 (2005) (arguing that party participation is a crucial feature of all models of
adjudication); H. Jefferson Powell, The Three Independences, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 611 (2004)
(arguing that adjudication entails judgments proceeding from different premises and operating
within different constraints).
330
28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also Leonard, supra note ___, at 277 (arguing that § 1331 provides
the jurisdictional basis for most federal statutory and constitutional claims). There also may be
statute-specific jurisdictional grants, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (commerce); 28 U.S.C. § 1338
(patent, copyright, and trademark); 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (civil rights); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Title
VII), although they generally are regarded as supplements to § 1331. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,
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plaintiff’s claim of right was created by or founded directly on or made
possible by federal law, where federal law creates a cause of action and
substantive right to a remedy for violation of that national rule.331 That
standard plainly is met when a plaintiff seeks civil relief for a claimed
violation of rights established by federal statute or constitutional
provision.332
The significance of this jurisdictional structure is that a rights-holder
can attempt to vindicate a federal right, once created, in federal court
without Congress having to do or say anything more about judicial
jurisdiction. The court possesses raw power to hear and resolve
substantive legal and factual issues brought before it; it merely awaits
the bringing of those claims by rights-holders. And the courts continue
to await those claims, with power to adjudicate them, unless and until
Congress affirmatively divests them of some portion of that jurisdiction
by carving out particular claims or issues.
What changes with a merits strip is the quantum of extant
substantive federal law and rights, the amount of real-world actors and
conduct subject to federal legal protection or constraint and the degree of
judicial enforceability of those rights. Merits strips reduce the number of
rights-holders, the number of duty-bound actors, or the amount of
conduct subject to legal constraint and suit. But they do not reduce that
quantum of judicial authority to hear whatever claims are or might
become possible, depending on the development of federal substantive
law.333
General federal question jurisdiction is akin to potential energy—it
exists as power, waiting to be released when acted upon by an outside
force. For the federal courts, that outside force is parties bringing civil
actions alleging injury and seeking relief under substantive federal law.
To the extent fewer parties are able to do so because of reductions in the
quantum of enforceable federal rights-creating law, the courts may face a
reduced caseload. Or courts may simply enter fewer judgments on the
merits in favor of plaintiffs, as their claims of right cannot succeed under
126 U.S. 1235, 1239-40 (2005) (stating that the specific jurisdictional grant for Title VII
underscores congressional desire to provide a federal forum for claims).
331
See Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 694-97 (compiling various definitions
offered by courts and commentators); see also, e.g. Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S.
369, 377 (2004) (describing requirement that claim be “made possible” by an applicable federal
statute); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (stating that a claim
arises under federal law where the plaintiff wins under one conceivable construction of federal law
and loses under another); Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)
(Holmes, J.) (arguing that a suit arises under federal law where that “law creates the cause of
action”); Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason for it; it’s Just Our Policy: Why the WellPleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS
L.J. 597, 656-57 (1987) (emphasizing the presence of federal issues “whose decision one way will
necessarily cause a result in the case and whose decision the other way will tend to prevent it”);
Mishkin, supra note ___, at 165 (describing requirement that claim be “founded ‘directly’ upon
national law”).
332
See Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 697-98.
333
See id. at 676-77 (arguing that Congress establishes jurisdiction “on an understanding that
extant or future statutes enacted under its substantive powers . . . provide a cause of action that
federal courts now are empowered to hear”); see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 (stating that Alien Tort
Statute provided courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate whatever rights were established by federal
Common Law).
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stripped substantive rules of law. But courts have not lost any of their
raw power to hear and resolve legal and factual issues. They merely are
exercising that power less frequently.
Much has been written about the federal “litigation explosion” that
began in the 1970s.334 But the trigger for that explosion was not the
broad grant of general federal question jurisdiction, which occurred 100
years earlier.335 Rather, the trigger was the expansion of substantive
federal law, particularly the enactment and interpretation of statutes
governing civil rights, labor and employment, and the environment.336
In other words, changing jurisdiction alone did nothing to change the
amount of litigation; it was only after substantive law expanded that the
amount of litigation expanded, even while federal question jurisdiction
remained largely unchanged.337 It follows that the amount of litigation
will be reduced by strips in substantive rights and in the enforceability of
substantive rights.338
This sharp distinction between federal jurisdiction and federal
litigation gets lost in discussions of stripping and the role of the courts.
The Long Range Plan provides a clear example. It describes the dispute
between “those who favor increased ‘federalization’ of the law against
those who favor limiting federal court jurisdiction.”339 Other
334

See Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accounability,
81 TEX. L. REV. 285, 292-93 (200) (discussing origins of fears of “litigation explosion” during
1970s); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 5 (1986)
(describing the “litigation explosion” or “hyperlexis” reading of modern American life, under which
more litigation is filed in American courts); see also Siegel, supra note ___, at 1114 (arguing that
Rehnquist Court jurisprudence can be understood as reflecting a hostility to, and an effort to limit,
private litigation).
335
See REDISH, supra note ___, at 96 (stating that Congress established general federalquestion jurisdiction in 1875); Mishkin, supra note ___, at 157 (same).
336
See Mishkin, supra note ___, at 157 (describing the “expanding scope of federal
legislation” and its connection to the power of federal courts); Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note
___, at 1004 (arguing that, post-New Deal, “the Supreme Court generally found that Congress had
the power to make an array of issues ‘federal,’ thus enabling growth of the federal courts’ docket”);
see also, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq; Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1968, 29 U.S.C. 651; Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §
12182; Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973; Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217,
91 Stat. 1566 (1977); Maine v. Thiboudot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (holding that § 1983 supports claims
for violations of federal statutes); Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690
(1978) (holding that municipalities are “persons” for purposes of § 1983); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (holding that Title VII prohibited employment programs having
racially discriminatory effect); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (establishing expansive
definition of “under color of state law” to permit claims against state government officials who
violate state law).
337
An amount-in-controversy requirement in § 1331 was eliminated in 1980, marking a slight
expansion in the scope of jurisdiction under the general federal question grant. See Arbaugh, 126 S.
Ct. at 1239-40. But most of the new statutes contained their own jurisdictional grants, giving the
courts power to hear cases “brought under” those statutes, without an amount-in-controversy
limitation. See, e.g. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-5(f)(3) (granting federal jurisdiction over claims “brought
under” substantive provisions of Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 1343 (a)(3) (granting federal jurisdiction
over claims brought under § 1983). Thus, it is unlikely that federal courts were able to hear cases
after the amendment to § 1331 in 1980 that they otherwise could not have heard. But cf. Thiboudot,
448 U.S. at 8 n.6 (accepting, under old version of § 1331, that there are some statutory claims that
could have been brought under § 1983 cause of action, but for which there would have been no
federal jurisdiction unless the amount-in-controversy requirement of § 1331 were satisfied).
338
See Siegel, supra note ___, at 1117-18 (describing ways in which judicial narrowing of
private rights and causes of action reflects hostility to the institution of litigation).
339
Long Range Plan, 166 F.R.D. at 88-89; see also Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note ___, at
980 (“Federal jurisdictional discussions thus became a means by which to enact conflict about legal
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commentators similarly speak of the problem that recognizing particular
constitutional claims “would dramatically expand the jurisdiction of
federal courts.”340
But increasing “federalization” of the law or recognizing new
constitutional claims sounds in an expansion of substantive law. It is not
the antithesis of limiting jurisdiction. Federalizing law and expanding
jurisdiction are necessarily distinct concepts, sometimes (although not
always) producing similar, not identical, results. So, too, is defederalizing law (which strips litigation) and stripping jurisdiction.
Congress could decline to expand or increase substantive law without
narrowing the general federal question jurisdiction of the courts over
claims “arising under” federal law. Similarly, Congress could expand the
scope and range of conduct and actors regulated by federal law, but at
the same time limit the jurisdiction of the courts, as by creating rights
enforceable only in state court.
3. Legislative Jurisdiction v. Judicial Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction means “something like legitimate authority.”341 But any
governmental body, not only courts, can wield “legitimate authority.”
The question is legitimate authority to do what?
This raises the critical distinction between judicial jurisdiction of the
federal courts and legislative (or prescriptive) jurisdiction of Congress.
The latter is the constitutional authority to legislate, to regulate particular
real-world actors and conduct by prescribing prospective legal rules of
general applicability.342 The former is the statutory and constitutional
authority of courts to adjudicate, to hear and resolve legal and factual
issues presented to them by parties.343 Stated differently, legislative
jurisdiction is power to prescribe primary legal rules creating rights and
imposing duties, while judicial jurisdiction is power to provide the
adjudicative forum when those duties have been ignored and rights
violated. Courts and commentators too easily confuse the two.344
In discussing substantive legal norms and rules in the context of
“granting or repealing federal jurisdiction,”345 commentators such as
Judith Resnik should be understood as referring to granting or repealing
federal legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction—the constitutional power
rules.”); Resnik, Federal Courts, supra note ___, at 2619-20 (describing Plan’s criticism of
Congress and calls for “restraint” in creating new federal causes of action on issues previously
resolved in state courts).
340
See Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, supra note ___, at 1035.
341
See Lee, supra note ___, at 1620.
342
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “’legislative jurisdiction’ . . . refers to ‘the authority of a state to make its law
applicable to persons or activities”); United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942,
953 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Wood, D., J., dissenting) (describing “jurisdiction to prescribe a rule
of law”); Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass’n, 816 F.2d 895, 898 (3d Cir. 1987) (describing
Congress’s “constitutional authority to act”); Leonard, supra note ___, at 280.
343
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
344
Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 813 (Scalia, J., dissenting); United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at
953 (Wood, D., J., dissenting).
345
Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note ___, at 979.
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(and wisdom) of Congress enacting rights-creating legislation and
enforcing particular norms as matters of federal law.346 Resnik is, at
times, more precise, describing Congress pulling issues “into the federal
net” by wielding its authority to make “an array of issues ‘federal’ and to
“regulate a broad range of activities and behaviors.”347 Here she plainly
(and quite properly) is talking about prescriptive jurisdiction, what
Harrison labels substantive powers, to regulate real-world actors and
conduct. The debate is about how much real-world conduct Congress
can or should regulate; it only incidentally is about increasing the federal
courts’ docket,348 and then only because § 1331 empowers the courts to
hear whatever federal law Congress enacts.349
Conversely, the argument that Congress should not regulate some
conduct because “certain problems should not become federal cases but
belong to the states”350 does not necessarily exclude such issues entirely
from the adjudicative authority of the federal courts. Some subset of
cases under state law still may come to federal court under a different
grant of judicial jurisdiction, most notably diversity.351
Even after the Morrison Court’s rejection of VAWA, a woman still
could sue her rapist for damages in federal court, at least in those few
cases in which victim and attacker are from different states and the
action is for more than $75,000. The federal court would apply state law
(assault or some other tort) in that case.352
But that simply drives home the point that the central issue is which
government (federal or state) will assert the legitimate authority to
prescribe applicable substantive rules of law creating rights and
imposing duties—in other words, who can or will assert prescriptive
jurisdiction—not whether federal courts provide the adjudicative forum.
The distinction between judicial jurisdiction and
legislative/prescriptive jurisdiction is essential to understanding need for
and role of statutory jurisdictional elements.353 Jurisdictional elements
relate solely to legislative/prescriptive jurisdiction. They function as a
nexus between the statute and the substantive constitutional authority
pursuant to which Congress enacted the statute; by requiring the plaintiff
to plead and prove that element, courts ensure that federal rules are not
and cannot be applied beyond the limits of congressional prescriptive
regulatory power.354 The statute by its terms does not and will not
346

Id. at 979-80; see also Resnik, Federal Courts, supra note ___, at 2620.
Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note ___, at 1004-06 & n.323.
348
See id. at 1004.
349
See Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 677-78; supra notes ___ and
accompanying text.
350
Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note ___, at 1004 (discussing Long Range Plan); see United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (seeking to protect against congressional regulation of
“family law and other areas of traditional state regulation”).
351
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (granting district courts original jurisdiction over civil actions,
inter alia, between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $ 75,000).
Another jurisdictional source might be where the defendant is a federal officer. See 28 U.S.C. 1442
(permitting removal to federal court of civil and criminal actions in which defendant is federal
officer).
352
See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
353
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
354
See Adler & Dorf, supra note ___, at 1153.
347
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regulate actors or conduct that Congress constitutionally could not
regulate.
But none of this says anything about the court’s authority to hear and
resolve a plaintiff’s claim of right under the statute. It speaks only to the
scope of the statute, a merits issue of who can sue whom for what
conduct and the outcome of the action when and if it is brought in any
court.355 A plaintiff cannot prevail if she does not plead and prove the
jurisdictional element, whether because the nexus is not included in the
statute or because she has failed to prove that element.356 But that is a
failure of her substantive claim only, not a failure of adjudicative
authority.
4. Jurisdiction as Party-Neutral
Jurisdiction must be party-neutral. A grant of subject matter
jurisdiction empowers the court to consider the entire merits of the case
and to enter judgment on the merits in favor of either party and against
either party.357 Jurisdiction cannot depend on the outcome of the merits
or on the specifics of the case at hand; we cannot understand a court to
lack jurisdiction if the factfinder finds in favor of the defendant, but to
have jurisdiction if the factfinder finds in favor of the plaintiff.358
Imagine, for example, a constitutional claim in which there is no
dispute as to what either party did in the real-world incident. The only
question is the legal one about the scope of the constitutional right at
issue and whether the conduct was, in fact, unconstitutional; the plaintiff
wins on an expansive constitutional interpretation and the defendant
wins on a narrow (stripping) interpretation. The district court obtains
jurisdiction over this claim under the general federal question
jurisdiction statute as a civil action “arising under” the Constitution of
the United States.
Having been granted jurisdiction, the court must have authority to
make either interpretation and to render judgment on the merits
accordingly. But either interpretation, and resulting judgment, must be
355
See Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 687 (arguing that the effects of nonsatisfaction of any element are the same—the plaintiff’s claim must fail).
356
For example, state action functions as a jurisdictional element for legislation enacted under
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000);
Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 684. A failure of a jurisdictional element may result
because Congress neglected to include the element, as in Morrison, or because the plaintiff fails to
prove it, as in a case in which a plaintiff sues a non-state-actor for constitutional violations under §
1983. See infra notes ___ and accompanying text.
357
See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1216
(2001) (arguing that jurisdiction means the court is “clothed with entire power to do justice
according to law, or according to equity”); Mishkin, supra note ___, at 166 (arguing that a court
with jurisdiction has power to enter judgment on the merits for defendant as well as plaintiff).
358
See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (“Jurisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the
possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which [plaintiffs] could actually
recover.”); Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States; How Criminal Prosecutions
Show that Standing Doctrine is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV.
2239, 2252 n.64 (1999) (“If a plaintiff fails to state a cause of action (or, under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a claim upon which relief can be granted), the dismissal is on the merits, not for
lack of jurisdiction.”); Mishkin, supra note ___, at 166 (“The power of the court to hear and decide
a case could hardly be made to depend upon the jury’s verdict.”).
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understood as a determination of real-world rights and duties and of
whether rights were violated or duties ignored on the facts at hand. The
unacceptable alternative is that the broad interpretation of the
Constitution is a decision on the merits of the plaintiff’s constitutional
claim, while the stripping interpretation becomes not a decision as to the
meaning of the Constitution, but as to the meaning of the court’s
adjudicative authority.
5. Non-Existence as Law
The unifying concept of merits stripping is that it results in nonexistence of any applicable rule of constitutional or statutory law
protecting or regulating the parties and conduct involved in the
occurrences at issue.359 No federal rule exists as law granting the
plaintiffs a right to be free from the particular conduct about which they
have sued; no existing federal rule exists as law imposing on the
defendants a duty to perform or refrain from performing the particular
conduct over which they have been sued. There is no right in existence
to be violated, enforced, or vindicated in court by one person against
another over particular real-world events.
The difference among the categories is how we arrived at this state
of non-existence. Consider several examples of merits strips.
1) Plaintiff sues his employer under the Safe Workplaces Act, a
federal statute creating a right to work in a safe environment and
providing for damages from an employer for work-related injuries.
Unfortunately for the plaintiff, although Congress passed this measure
(which was the result of long-term union lobbying efforts), the President
vetoed it and Congress was unable to override the veto; the statute thus
never was enacted it into law according to constitutional processes.360
2) Plaintiff sues the man who sexually assaulted her under the
Violence Against Women Act, the federal statute creating a right to be
free from private, non-employment-related gender-motivated violence;
the court dismisses the claim, striking VAWA down as exceeding
Congress’ legislative authority under the Commerce Clause and § 5.361
3) Plaintiff sues a small-town Mom-and-Pop convenience store with
five employees, for which she performed accounting services as an
independent contractor, alleging she was fired because of her sex and
sexual orientation. She asserts a Title VII claim, although Title VII does
not reach entities with fewer than fifteen employees, does not protect
independent contractors, and does not prohibit discrimination based on
sexual orientation.362
4) Plaintiff, an obese young adult with health problems, who has
been eating McDonald’s every day for ten years, sues the company in
federal court (on diversity jurisdiction) for state-law fraud and products
359

See Adler & Dorf, supra note ___, at 1119; supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
See Adler & Dorf, supra note ___, at 1117-18; supra Part I.A.1.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 13, 617-18 (2000); supra Part I.A.5.
362
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
360
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liability, claiming that the company used unreasonably unhealthy
products in making its food and failed to disclose the negative health
effects. She seeks to recover medical expenses related to her obesity.
While the action is pending, the Senate passes, and the President signs,
the cheeseburger bill.363 McDonald’s adds a defense under § 3(b) of the
bill, which requires dismissal of certain pending actions; McDonald’s
produces evidence that it is a manufacturer of a qualified food product
and that plaintiff’s claim seeks damages relating to obesity and other
health problems.364
5) Plaintiff, a spokesperson for the state Attorney General who
criticized her boss during a press conference, is fired and sues the State
and the Office of the Attorney General for damages under § 1983,
claiming a violation of the First Amendment. But states and state
agencies are not “persons” subject to suit within the meaning of §
1983.365 Moreover, the plaintiff’s speech, being part of her job, is not
constitutionally protected.366
6) Plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim alleging a First Amendment
violation against a Major League Baseball team, a private entity, because
she was kicked out of the team’s privately owned ballpark for wearing a
t-shirt declaring that the opposing team “sucks.”367 Such a private entity
cannot violate the First Amendment and cannot be sued under § 1983
because it does not act “under color” of state or local law.368
7) An individual held by the U.S. military at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, brings a civil action for damages, alleging that he was subject to
cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment while in custody, in violation
of the McCain Amendment of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.369
But no private right of action exists to enforce that provision.
It is obvious that, as a descriptive matter, every plaintiff should and
will lose on each of these claims and none will be afforded relief in
federal court, because the legal rule that each seeks to enforce does not
exist as law. Non-existence in Example 1 is obvious—the rightscreating legislation never was enacted into what is understood as federal
law under the Constitution, so the rights that would have been created
have not been.370 Non-existence in Example 2 follows from Adler and
Dorf’s argument that constitutional provisions establish conditions for

363

Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R.554, 109th Cong. (2005).
H.R. 554, §§ 3(b), 4; supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
365
See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989); supra Part I.A.4.
366
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006).
367
See Howard M. Wasserman, Fans, Free Expression, and the Wide World of Sports, 67 U.
PITT. L. REV. 525, 568-69 (2006) [hereinafter Wasserman, Fans].
368
See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001);
Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private Sector:
With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537, 1544 (1998); Wasserman, Fans,
supra note ___, at 538; see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (“As a
matter of substantive constitutional law the state-action requirement reflects judicial recognition of
the fact that ‘most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by
governments.’” (quoting Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978))).
369
42 U.S.C. § 20000dd; supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
370
See Adler & Dorf, supra note ___, at 1129 (arguing that Article I, § 7 is intuitively
understood as constituting the difference between law and nonlaw).
364
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the existence of federal law; a law that is invalid as against any
constitutional limitation does not exist as federal law.371
Examples 3 through 7 reflect non-existence on a different level. In
Example 7, although a legal rule exists creating the right to be free from
cruel, inhumane, and degrading punishment, no extant legal rule
provides for private enforcement of the right. Stated differently, no
enforceable right exists as law, meaning the right that does exist is
narrower than it otherwise might have been.372
As for Examples 3-6, we might say that the constitutional or
statutory legal norm exists but was not violated in the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence to which it is being applied, because the actors
and conduct do not fall within terms of the legal rule—that is, the extant
rule was not violated by the actors or conduct at hand.373 But it is
equally accurate to describe this as non-existence of these rights as law.
No existing legal rule establishes rights and imposes duties on these
actors for the acts and events at issue. No legal norm exists to be
violated by these actors and in these events because law stopped short of
establishing that norm. Since we are dealing with stripping—one-way
diminution, narrowing, or limiting—of rights and duties, this seems a
more appropriate description of the outcome.
We might further separate Example, in that the “under color” of state
law limitation in § 1983 is a jurisdictional element, necessary to the
exercise of § 5 power that produced the stature; § 1983 arguably would
be invalid if the element were absent and Congress sought to regulate
non-state action.374 By contrast, the striping elements in Example 3 are
products of basic policy choices as to legislative reach and scope; the
statute would be constitutionally valid regardless of the presence or
breadth of those limitations. But all elements dictate what the plaintiff
must plead and prove to prevail on her claim of right (or the defendant
on her defense); there is no difference for these purposes between policy
elements and jurisdictional elements.375
The essence of the merits of legal claims of right is the answer to
who can sue whom over what conduct.376 Merits look to whether a legal
norm creates rights in some, imposes duties in others, and whether that
norm has been violated by events in the real world.377 In all seven
371

See id. at 1130.
See Zeigler, supra note ___, at 107 (arguing that the ability to enforce a right defines its
scope and nature); see supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
373
This is how I previously described, for example, attempts to bring a Title VII action against
companies with fewer than fifteen employees. See Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 687,
698.
374
See Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass’n, 816 F.2d 895, 898 (3d Cir. 1987) (“[T]he state
action requirement of a § 1983 claim constitutes a basis for Congress to regulate conduct pursuant to
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000)
(emphasizing that Congress’ ability to enforce Fourteenth Amendment is limited by fact that
Amendment only prohibits state action); Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 680; supra
notes ___ and accompanying text.
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See Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 687 (arguing that the treatment of every
element of a claim, jurisdictional or otherwise, should be the same).
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Harrison, supra note ___, at 2515.
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See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 237 (1979) (defining substance cause of action as
going to the “alleged invasion of ‘recognized legal rights’ upon which a litigants bases his claim for
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examples, no legal norm exists to be violated or remedied in the events
at hand, given the narrowness of those norms. Each of the plaintiffs has
sought to recover on a claim of right that has been stripped and thus does
not exist, and each will lose. And that loss will be tied to the merits.
But the federal courts do remain open for business, possessing
authority to hear and resolve any claims of existing rights that may be
brought before them. What has changed is that, as a result of some type
of merits strip, those claims will not succeed because no rules exist to
create or enforce rights to be violated in the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence at issue.
It might be tempting to argue that a claim does not “arise under”
federal law for § 1331 purposes if no federal rule exists making unlawful
the conduct at issue. But if Adler and Dorf are correct, every federal
claim fails because no legal rule exists proscribing the conduct or
creating rights and duties for the actors at issue. If every failed federal
claim is understood as reflecting the non-existence of a legal rule
governing the actors, conduct, and events at issue, then every failed
claim would deprive the court of jurisdiction. This forces the
unworkable conclusion that whenever the plaintiff wins it is on the
merits, while whenever the defendant wins it is because the court lacks
jurisdiction.378
B. Facial and Functional Distinctions Between Stripping Acts
We turn now to the facial and functional differences between merits
strips and jurisdiction strips and how and why it is important to properly
characterize the enactment at issue.
1. Content of the Strip
The first is where the stripping act, be it legislative, executive, or
judicial, is directed. This stems from the plain language of the particular
enactment and the requirement from Arbaugh that Congress clearly
establish a provision as jurisdictional for it to be applied as
jurisdictional, otherwise it is understood as merits-related.379
As with a jurisdiction grant, a jurisdiction strip is an exercise of
Congress’ structural powers. It is directed to Article III courts; it speaks
in jurisdictional terms about particular classes of cases that courts no
longer may hear and decide, although they would have had the power to
relief.”); Harrison, supra note ___, at 2520-21 (arguing that the merits demand from the plaintiff
allegations and proof that “the defendant’s conduct was wrongful (inconsistent with a duty resting
on the defendant) and that the plaintiff is within the category of persons entitled to judicial relief
because of the wrongful conduct”); Zeigler, supra note ___, at 105 (“A legal right imposes a
correlative duty on another to act or to refrain from acting for the benefit of the person holding the
right.”).
378
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
379
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 (2005) (“[W]hen Congress does not rank a
statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as
nonjurisdictional in character.”); Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 693 (arguing for plainlanguage approach to identifying what provisions are jurisdictional and what go to merits).
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hear but for the stripping enactment.380 A jurisdiction strip reduces the
quantum of judicial authority to adjudicate particular legal and factual
issues. For example, if a jurisdiction strip such as the Constitution
Restoration Act of 2005 passes, federal courts would possess jurisdiction
over all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties, as
they do under § 1331, unless the civil action (as indicated by the
pleadings) involves a challenge to government’s acknowledgement of
God as the sovereign source of law, liberty, or government.381
On the other hand, a merits strip is an exercise of substantive
congressional power or a judicial or executive interpretation and
application of a statute passed as an exercise of substantive
congressional power.382 The stripping rule is directed at real-world
actors, speaking in terms of rights, duties, and regulated conduct. A
merits strip eliminates rights and corresponding duties under federal law,
removing any protections for or constraints on real-world actors and
their conduct. There are no federal rights to be vindicated and no one to
initiate successful claims of the right. This perhaps affects the judicial
workload, to the extent the narrower rules dissuade rights-holders from
bringing claims; otherwise, it merely dictates which party will prevail on
those claims.
The distinction further implicates the limits of Congress’ structural
powers. Congress can control the jurisdiction of federal courts, at least
to some degree.383 Congress also can control the jurisdiction of state
courts over federal claims and issues,384 at least if it is clear in doing
so.385 Congress also can dictate the content and enforceability of federal
substantive law.386 But it is far less clear, and far more controversial,
380
See Sager, Constitutional Limitations, supra note ___, at 27 (discussing effect of statutory
grants of jurisdiction that existed prior to congressional strip).
381
Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S.520 109th Cong. (2005); supra notes ___ and
accompanying text.
382
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
383
See Eisenberg, supra note ___, at 514 (“While Congress does not have unfettered control
over lower court jurisdiction such that it could in effect abolish the courts by obliterating their
jurisdiction, it is also clear that some degree of congressional control, consistent with the
Constitution, is valid.”); see sources cited supra note ___.
384
See REDISH, supra note ___, at 149; Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Congressional Power and State
Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J. 949, 975 (2006) (“Hamilton understood the power that the
Constitution conferred on Congress to constitute inferior tribunals to be a power to constitute them
with exclusive jurisdiction over any and all Article III cases and controversies.”); cf. Hart, supra
note ___, at 1401 (arguing that while Congress can regulate jurisdiction of state courts in federal
matters, it cannot do so unconstitutionally); infra note
385
See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, ___ (1990) (emphasizing the
requirement of a clear statement in order to vest exclusive, rather than concurrent, federal
jurisdiction); THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he inference seems to be
conclusive that the State courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the
laws of the Union where it was not expressly prohibited.”); see also REDISH, supra note ___, at 150
(describing the general rule that “when a federal statute is silent on the question of state court
jurisdiction, it should be presumed that state courts will have concurrent jurisdiction over federal
causes of action”); Bellia, supra note ___, at 976 (“Under general principles of law, so long as an
Article III case or controversy was transitory (or even local to a state), a state could exercise
jurisdiction over it.”); Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note ___, at 1007 (“Congress should have a
presumption in favor of jurisdictional grants vesting concurrently in state and federal courts so as to
avoid essentializing either jurisdiction . . .”).
386
See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note ___, at 965 (“If the legislature changes the applicable
law, for example, judicial decisions obviously ought to reflect this fact.”).
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whether Congress has the power to strip state courts of jurisdiction over
state law claims, particularly claims arising under that state’s own
laws.387
This affects how we characterize laws such as the cheeseburger or
handgun acts, both of which purport to control state-law claims brought
in state court.388 To call these jurisdiction strips confronts directly the
controversy of whether Congress can control state-court jurisdiction over
its own claims. Rather, both laws are better understood as limiting the
reach of state substantive tort by interposing a federal defense for some
actors against liability for some conduct under state law. This
understanding avoids potential constitutional problems as to the limits of
structural congressional power.389
2. Stripping Remainders
A second difference is what remains after the stripping rule. This
distinction focuses on those real-world actors to whom rights have been
given, on whom duties have been imposed, and from whom those rights
have been stripped.
In the wake of a true jurisdiction strip, federal rights remain in place
and enforceable, just not in federal court. But, for example, even if
federal courts are stripped of the power to adjudicate challenges to
government acknowledgement of God as the sovereign source of law,
liberty, or government,390 there nevertheless remains a right, grounded in
the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, not to be confronted or
coerced by government displays or acts that have the purpose or effect of
endorsing religion.391.392 This jurisdiction strip only incidentally affects
holders of federal rights by depriving them of one forum (albeit the

387

See Bellia, supra note ___, at 1001 (“There is no historical record specifically addressing
what power Congress has to provide jurisdictional rules for state courts in purely state law cases.”);
id. at 1009 (arguing that the Founders “recognized that the courts of a sovereign have jurisdiction, at
a minimum, over the legal relations of its citizens or persons present within its territory. For
Congress to divest state courts of jurisdiction over such cases would conflict with this general
principle”); Siegel, supra note ___, at 1171 (arguing that recent federal legislation mandating and
prohibiting certain procedures in state courts constitutes “a relatively new development that
arguably undermines a tacit understanding about the appropriate exercise of federal power”); see
also THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that it is “a just principle that
every government ought to possess the means of executing its own provisions by its own authority”)
(emphasis in original). Henry Hart emphasized, for example, that when Congress sought to deprive
both state and federal courts of jurisdiction over particular claims under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, it simultaneously extinguished the substantive statutory liability. See Hart, supra note ___, at
1383.
388
See supra Part I.A.3.
389
Cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2763-64 (2006) (slip op. at 10) (describing
“grave questions” about the scope of congressional control over jurisdiction).
390
See Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S.520, 109th Cong. (2005).
391
See County of Allegheny v. ACLU of Greater Pittsburgh, 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989) (“[B]y
prohibiting government endorsement of religion, the Establishment Clause prohibits precisely what
occurred here: the government's lending its support to the communication of a religious
organization's religious message.”); see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)
(striking down school district program of student-led prayer prior to football games); County of
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at ___ (considering constitutionality of religious displays in county building).
392
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historically best forum) in which to vindicate those rights; but other
forums, namely state courts, remain.393
Whether that is a positive development presents the question of
adjudicative parity between federal and state courts in interpreting and
applying federal law and protecting federal rights. Parity refers to the
belief that “state courts are to be deemed fungible with the federal courts
as interpreters and enforcers of federal law.”394 Whether it exists has
been a subject of seemingly unresolvable scholarly debate, ranging from
the view that state courts are less likely to enforce federal rights395 to the
view that the assumption is unwarranted396 to the view that neither
position is provable or definable.397
The concept of parity actually stands in sharp tension with the power
to jurisdiction strip. Most jurisdiction-stripping proposals are grounded,
explicitly or implicitly, on the belief (and likely the hope) that state
courts will be less likely to follow controversial Supreme Court
precedent or to uphold controversial or unpopular claims of right.398
393
See Bator, supra note ___, at 628-29 (“The state courts do constitute an ultimate protection
against tyrannous government.”); Gunther, supra note ___, at 920 (“Congress merely relies on the
state courts to enforce federal rights, part of their tradition, originally contemplated role . . .”); Hart,
supra note ___, at 1364 (arguing that the “consequence is merely to force proceedings to be brought,
if at all, in a state court”); Sager, Constitutional Limitations, supra note ___, at 41 (arguing that
manipulating jurisdiction to check federal courts “offers no control over the state courts,” which
continue to be bound by existing Supreme Court precedent); Weinberg, supra note ___, at 1415
(“[A]s long as there is access to state courts for enforcement of law, the question [of jurisdictionstripping] cannot have much bite.”).
394
Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts:
Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 92 (1998); see Bator, supra
note ___, at 627 (arguing for assumption that “in the long run, the state courts will be respected and
equal partners with the lower federal courts in the enterprise of formulating and enforcing of federal
constitutional principles”).
395
See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1120 (1977) (describing
three reasons that federal trial courts provide an institutionally preferable forum for vindicating
federal rights); Redish & Sklaver, supra note ___, at 99 (“The fact that the framers vested state
courts with authority to interpret and enforce federal law does not necessarily imply solicitousness
for state judges or necessarily reflect the belief that state courts are the equal of the federal courts as
interpreters of federal law.”); Sager, Constitutional Limitations, supra note ___, at 64 (“Congress
should be similarly limited in its ability to relegate article III cases to the state courts, whose judges
do not and cannot enjoy article III security.”).
396
See Bator, supra note ___, at 633 (“[T]he claim that cases should be channeled to the
federal courts because of the special receptivity of federal judges to constitutional values may
embody a narrow and partisan vision of what constitutional values are.”); id. at 630 (“State supreme
court justices as a group are well paid and have as much prestige as federal judges.”); Gunther,
supra note ___, at 918 (“The underlying assumption that relegation of a federal claim to the state
court system invariably produces less vigorous enforcement of the federal right . . . is itself
suspect.”); Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457, 1464 (2005)
(describing arguments that state courts have improved procedurally and institutionally and no longer
function as in the Jim Crow/civil rights era)
397
See Chemerinsky, supra note ___, at 235 (“[N]either side advances the debate past an
intuitive judgment as to whether state courts are equal to federal courts in their willingness and
ability to protect federal rights.”); Rubenstein, Superiority, supra note ___, at 605 (agreeing that
anecdotal empirical evidence sheds little light on forum allocation decisions).
398
See Gunther, supra note ___, at 919 (describing the “obvious motivation of the members of
Congress who introduce jurisdiction-stripping proposals: the ‘get at’ the Supreme Court, to express
hostility to Supreme Court decisions, to provide a less interventionist forum for the adjudication of
federal claims”); Neuborne, supra note ___, at 1105-06 (discussing concern of “pretext for
funneling federal constitutional decisionmaking into state courts precisely because they are less
likely to be receptive to vigorous enforcement of federal constitutional doctrine”); Sager,
Constitutional Limitations, supra note ___, at 74 (“The motive behind the current jurisdictional
proposals is transparent. Congress’ goal is avowedly that of displacing disfavored federal judicial
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Congress also likely hopes that the act of stripping jurisdiction and
pushing federal claims into state court will signal to the state courts what
Congress would prefer the law to be and whether it wants individual
claimants to win.399
Parity assumes that state courts will take seriously their obligations
faithfully to apply federal law and to vindicate federal rights, even
unpopular rights asserted by unpopular rights-holders and grounded on
unpopular or controversial Supreme Court decisions.400 Jurisdiction
stripping thus may not achieve the desired result of restraining “out-ofcontrol judges” because it leaves state courts free to act, including free to
follow unpopular Supreme Court constitutional precedent.401 For the
same reason, it may not achieve the desired result of stripping
substantive federal rights. Merits strips, attacking as they do the
enforceable federal right, are more certain and direct in achieving the
congressional goal of narrowing federal law.
They also are more transparent. To affect a merits strip, the relevant
legal actor must make obvious in its legal pronouncement that
substantive rights are being diminished and what the scope of those
rights will be.402 If the goal and result is diminishment or
nonenforcement of some rights, the legal rule maker must say so.403 It
cannot play what some commentators call a “political shell game”—
deceiving the public as to the actual state of substantive law by
manipulating process to achieve a result rather than dictating the result
by changing substantive rules of decision.404 The transparency of merits
precedent . . .”); id. at 68 (“Congress betrays its hope and expectation that the state courts will
dishonor federal precedent and refuse to recognize the disfavored rights.”); see also Resnik, Trial as
Error, supra note ___, at 980 (“Protesting federal jurisdiction can also be a way to object to an
underlying legal norm . . .”).
399
Sager, Constitutional Limitations, supra note ___, at 40-41; id. at 69 (arguing that state
courts are particularly vulnerable as adjudicative forums in the face of the “obvious desire of
Congress that disfavored claims be repudiated”).
400
See Bator, supra note ___, at 624 (“[N]o matter where we draw the line, it is virtually
inevitable that the state courts will in fact continue to be asked to play a substantial role in the
formulation and application of federal constitutional principles . . .”); Redish & Sklaver, supra note
___, at 92 (arguing that the principle of parity derives from the point that state courts are “just as
competent to adjudicate and enforce federal laws as are federal courts”); see also Chemerinsky,
supra note ___, at 304 (arguing that “individuals alleging constitutional violations should have a
chance to be heard in the forum, state court or federal court, that they perceive to be most
sympathetic.”).
401
See Sager, Constitutional Limitations, supra note ___, at 42 (arguing that jurisdiction
stripping “in the end offers Congress only the mean solace of pushing cases from one judicial
bailiwick into another”); see also Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S.520, 109th Cong. § 301
(2005) (providing that federal court decisions regarding government acknowledgement of God are
not binding precedent in state courts). In fact, as to some of the areas that Congress has tried to push
into state courts, such as gay rights, state courts have been more protective in their interpretations of
state law than the federal courts had been. See Rubenstein, Superiority, supra note ___, at 607
(stating that several state courts interpreted state constitutional provisions to invalidate sodomy
laws); Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (holding that
prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying violated state constitution).
402
The exception is the category of strip that merely tinkers with causes of action or remedies,
but not the rights themselves. See supra Part I.A.6. That is why Pamela Karlan labels that category
insidious: it lacks the transparency from which political accountability flows. See Karlan, supra
note ___, at 185; supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
403
See Eisenberg, supra note ___, at 521 (describing suspicion of jurisdictional statutes that
attempt to control judicial results rather than dockets).
404
Redish & Pudelski, supra note ___, at 450.
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strips enhances democratic accountability; the public better understands
what has been done to substantive law and can hold the stripper (at least
if it is Congress or the President) to answer for unpopular limits on
rights.405 This contrasts with hidden limitations on rights effected by
jurisdiction strips. For example, the Detainee Treatment Act contains
one provision that sweepingly creates a right for military detainees to
receive certain minimum levels of humane treatment and to be free from
torture, while a separate provision strips federal courts of jurisdiction to
hear any claims that those rights have been violated.406
Merits strips do more than shift cases among judicial forums; they
eliminate cases (or at least successful cases) altogether.407 A merits strip
means no federal real-world right exists as law to be vindicated and no
federal real-world duty exists as law to be enforced in any court, federal
or state. The result of Morrison is that there is no (and can be no)
federal right (as opposed to a right created by some other sovereign) to
be free from private, non-employment-related gender-motivated violence
and no federal duty (as opposed to a duty imposed by some other
sovereign) to refrain from such violence. The result of Title VII’s
limitations on the definition of employer means there is no federal right
to be free from race or sex discrimination in employment if one works
for a company with fewer than 15 employees; and, conversely, there is
no federal duty to refrain from such discrimination imposed on a
company with fewer than 15 employees. The handgun and cheeseburger
laws both narrow the reach of state common law negligence (and the
rights and duties established), whether in state court or federal court (as
on diversity jurisdiction).
3. Non-Existence and the Litigation Process
A stripping enactment (regardless of its source) is itself a rule of law,
albeit a narrow(er) one. A plaintiff’s claim, asserting one of those
stripped rights, still requires resolution of legal and factual issues via
adjudicative decision making within the litigation process. Having
defined the many categories of merits strips, the question becomes what
litigation of stripping enactment looks like. Ultimately, the line between
jurisdiction and merits is about two components of the litigation process
itself: determining controlling legal rules and determining the time and
manner in which legal and factual issues underlying those rules are
resolved.

405
See id. at 454-55 (“When Congress simultaneously alters the essence of a substantive law
through procedural or evidentiary means, the legislators' vote on the substantive portion of the law
is effectively a sham.”).
406
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (stripping federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas or other
claims against the United States by or on behalf of individual detained at Guantanamo Bay) with 42
U.S.C. § 2000dd(a) (“No individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States
Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment.”); see supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
407
See Siegel, supra note ___, at 1175 (arguing that only stripping a party of a right to bring a
civil action can ensure that a plaintiff will be unable to find a judicial forum favorable to her claim).
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No matter how “realistic” it may be to conflate or merge the
concepts, therefore, we must keep true jurisdiction stripping distinct
from merits stripping.
a. Retroactivity of Stripping Enactments
The first litigation consequence is the possible retroactive
application of an enactment—its application to cases pending at the time
the strip is enacted or based on conduct occurring prior to the strip. The
characterization dictates which of two opposite rules controls in the
absence of express legislative statement. If the new legal rule strips
substantive rights, the presumption is against application of the stripping
act.408 On the other hand, if the new legal rule strips judicial jurisdiction,
the absent an express reservation the presumption favors application of
the stripping act, because courts “have regularly applied intervening
statutes conferring or ousting jurisdiction, whether or not jurisdiction lay
when the underlying conduct occurred or when the suit was filed.”409
The reasoning behind this difference was the source of disagreement
between Justice Stevens’ majority opinion and Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.410 Justice Stevens views the presumption of
retroactivity of jurisdictional statutes not as an independent rule, but as
the nonapplication of the general presumption against retroactivity.411
This follows from Justice Stevens’ overall approach to the concept of
retroactivity. Retroactivity problems arise not simply from the
application of a new statute to a pending action or to pre-enactment
conduct, but from “retroactive effect,” where the new rule would “impair
rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for
past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already
completed.”412 But a jurisdiction-stripping rule has no retroactive effect
because it “’takes away no substantive right but simply changes the
tribunal that is to hear the case.’”413 The presumption against
retroactivity therefore is not applicable to jurisdiction-stripping rules
because the underlying policy concerns are not implicated.
Justice Scalia proceeds more directly, from a sharper distinction
between jurisdiction strips and merits strips. As to the former, absent a
clear and explicit reservation by Congress, the strip applies to pending
cases (requiring dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).414 This
408
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994) (“If the statute would operate
retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional
intent favoring such a result.”);; see Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112, 117 (1952) (describing
general rule that “statute is not to be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required by
explicit language or by necessary implication”).
409
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274; see Bruner, 343 U.S. at 115 (holding that absent an express
reservation of jurisdiction, an intervening jurisdiction strip deprived district court of jurisdiction).
410
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
411
Id. at 2764.
412
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280; id. at 269-70 (“[T]he court must ask whether the new provision
attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.”).
413
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2765 (citing Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508 (1916)).
414
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2810 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“An ancient and unbroken line of
authority attests that statutes ousting jurisdiction unambiguously apply to cases pending at their
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is not a judicial canon or presumption, he argues, but “simple
recognition of the reality that the plain import of a statute repealing
jurisdiction is to eliminate the power to consider and render judgment—
in an already pending case no less than in a case yet to be filed.”415
Implicitly, a merits stripping provision, not going to judicial structure in
the same way, lacks similar plain import.
For our purposes, the difference between these approaches is of no
moment. Either recognizes a difference between jurisdiction strips and
merits strips requiring different treatment. Either requires proper
characterization to determine, in cases pending at the time of a new
enactment or based on pre-enactment conduct, whether to apply the prior
legal rules or the new, stripped legal rules.
b. Process and Fact-finding
A court in federal question cases ordinarily measures its jurisdiction
at the first stage of the litigation process. The court reviews the face of
the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint and predicts whether her claim
“arises under” the Constitution; that is, whether her claim of right is
created or made by possible by federal constitutional or statutory law.416
A true jurisdiction-stripping enactment (consider, again, the Constitution
Restoration Act) narrows the preexisting grant of general “arising under”
jurisdiction in § 1331. The court must consider this additional
jurisdictional rule in conjunction with § 1331 in measuring its
jurisdiction.417 The prediction, still based on the well-pleaded complaint,
is whether the claim arises under the First Amendment for § 1331
purposes and whether, even if it does, it is a claim predicated on a
governmental entity’s acknowledgement of God as the sovereign source
of law, liberty, and government.418
Claims of stripped rights, going as they do to who can sue whom
over what conduct, are adjudicated at different times and in a different
manner in the process. First, the court will preview the merits of the
plaintiff’s claims and any defenses to determine—based solely on the
four corners of the plaintiff’s complaint419 or all pleadings,420 or on a

effective date.”); id. at 2811 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“To alter this plain meaning, our cases have
required an explicit reservation of pending cases in the jurisdiction-repealing statute.”).
415
Id. at 2810-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2811-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
rule is “simply the acknowledgement of the unambiguous meaning of such provisions”); see also
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring dismissal “whenever it appears” that the court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction).
416
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
417
Cf. Sager, Constitutional Limitations, supra note ___, at 27-28 (considering relation
between preexisting grants of general federal question jurisdiction and new strip of a portion of that
jurisdiction).
418
See Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S.520, §§ 101-102 109th Cong. (2005).
419
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (permitting dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted”); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (looking to
whether it “appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitled him to relief”); Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 653, 663.
420
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
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summary judgment preview of evidence uncovered in discovery421-whether there are any disputes of historical fact requiring trial and
whether the plaintiff’s claim is worthy of plenary consideration at trial or
instead can be resolved pretrial.422
The question is whether, in light of the narrowness of substantive
federal law resulting from the merits strip (that is, in light of the
substantive federal law that exists), it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot
succeed on her claim because she has no right and the defendant no duty
in the conduct, transaction, or occurrence at issue. It may be obvious
from the complaint that plaintiff seeks to recover in tort for health
problems related to consumption of fast food, a claim that fails in the
face of the federal defense created by the cheeseburger bill. Perhaps it is
obvious from a preview of the evidence that the plaintiff cannot prove a
particular element whose presence strips the scope of the legal rule—that
the defendant acted under color of state law or that it met the statutory
definition of employer under Title VII. Or it may be that there is no
dispute as to the defendant’s conduct, but only a legal question whether
the federal statutory rule granting the plaintiff a right to be free from that
conduct is constitutionally valid and thus whether it exists as law.
To the extent any material facts are in dispute as to the real-world
actors and conduct, the case only can be resolved at the third-stage of the
process—trial on the merits. Disputes of fact will be resolved,
inferences from facts drawn, and controlling substantive law applied to
facts to determine whether the defendant breached a duty and violated
the plaintiff’s federal rights. In the hypothetical cases discussed, all of
which seek money damages, the plaintiff would have the option of
having a jury as the finder of fact and any appellate review of those
findings would be limited and highly deferential.423
This, then, is the vital procedural difference between merits strips
and jurisdiction strips. Material factual issues underlying jurisdictionstripping statutes are resolved by the judge, not the jury.424 At stake in
characterizing an enactment is the right to a trial on the merits by a jury,
which may be lost if courts mischaracterize a merits strip as a
jurisdiction strip.
And that is the problem in a case such as United Phosphorus, Ltd. v.
Angus Chemical Co.425 A sharply Seventh Circuit considered the
421
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Wasserman,
Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 653-54, 663.
422
See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Transsubstantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067,
2087 (1989); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 455 (1986); Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 652
423
See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (stating that jury right in actions “at common law” shall be
“preserved” and limiting reconsideration of facts found by jury); City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 709 (1999) (holding that constitutional claims for damages
under § 1983 are actions at law to which Seventh Amendment attaches); Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996) (discussing limits on judicial reconsideration of juryfound facts); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473 & n.8 (1962) (holding that legal issues
for which jury trial demanded must be submitted to jury); see also Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra
note ___, at 663-64.
424
See Idleman, supra note ___, at 60-61; Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 651.
425
322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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FTAIA, the law narrowing the range of foreign conduct to which the
Sherman Act shall apply.426 FTAIA stripped something; the question is
what.
In characterizing the law as a jurisdiction strip, the majority made
every mistake common in the conflation of the concepts. It ignored the
plain language of the FTAIA, which speaks of the real-world conduct to
which the law applies and says nothing about judicial jurisdiction.427 It
considered the legislative history that spoke of limiting federal
extraterritorial jurisdiction in Sherman Act cases.428 But the court, and
Congress in the legislative history cited, conflated judicial and legislative
jurisdiction.429 Concerns over the limits of extraterritorial application of
substantive law are questions of legislative jurisdiction to prescribe legal
rules regulating foreign conduct and actors.430 The references to
“antitrust jurisdiction” in the FTAIA history are better understood as
referring to the application of United States substantive antitrust law to
foreign conduct and to the exercise of congressional
legislative/prescriptive jurisdiction over foreign conduct.
The direct result of the majority opinion in United Phosphorus was
the deprivation of the plaintiff’s jury right. The district court had made
findings that, on the facts at issue, defendant’s conduct had no direct,
substantial, and foreseeable effect on domestic interstate commerce and
the court of appeals concluded that those findings were not clearly
erroneous.431 But if the FTAIA is properly understood as a merits strip,
a narrowing of substantive antitrust rights and duties, then such judicial
fact-finding was improper. Any dispute as to these facts should have
been for trial and resolution by the jury.432 That difference in the
identity of the factfinder is potentially significant to the outcome of the
action.433 Such procedural consequences are essential to the
merits/jurisdiction divide and thus must be taken into account in
properly characterizing distinct forms of stripping.434
4. Structural Legitimacy
426
15 U.S.C. § 6A (providing that the Sherman Act “shall not apply to conduct involving trade
or commerce . . . with foreign nations” unless the conduct has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect” on non-foreign interstate commerce); supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
427
See United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 220 (Wood, D., J., dissenting); Wasserman,
Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 688-89.
428
United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 951-52.
429
See H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 11, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2496 (discussing
FTAIA as establishing “predicate for antitrust jurisdiction” and “standards necessary for assertion of
United States Antitrust jurisdiction.”); United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 952 (discussing legislative
history).
430
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813-14 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 689.
431
United Phosphorus, 322 F. 3d at 953; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b) (establishing “clear
error” as standard of review of judicially found facts).
432
See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959) (holding that jury right
applies to treble-damages claims under antitrust act).
433
See Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter O. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE L.J.
1405, 1463 (2000).
434
See Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 662 (“Confusing whether a fact issue goes
to jurisdiction or merits produces uncertainty as to when the issue should be resolved, by whom, and
under what standard, along with confusion as to the meaning of that resolution.”).
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The final difference goes to the basic understanding of constitutional
structure and what legal rule makers are empowered to do. There is
longstanding doctrinal and theoretical controversy over jurisdiction
stripping. Objections to congressional jurisdiction-stripping threats are
grounded in the text and structure of the Constitution,435 separation of
powers,436 judicial independence,437 due process,438 and the practicalities
of modern American constitutional society.439
Regardless of how that debate resolves itself doctrinally and
theoretically, no similar structural objections attach to merits stripping.
The various categories all are products of the exercise of unquestioned
power in some decision maker to establish substantive legal rules.
Congress clearly is the master of whether to exercise its lawmaking
powers and the scope of resulting legislation.440 The executive and
judicial departments properly exercise authority to interpret and apply
congressional enactments, subject to congressional correction.441 And
the courts properly wield authority to interpret the scope and meaning of
constitutional provisions, particularly rights-granting provisions.442
One can, of course, disagree with the resulting scope of rights—the
fact that the level of rights and duties has fallen below the preferred
normative baseline.443 And one can disagree with constitutional doctrine
that produces particular outcomes and particular understandings of
federal constitutional law.444
But that is the only legitimate objection to merits stripping. There
should be no structural objections, no arguments asserting a lack of
legitimate authority in the relevant actor to affect the merits strip. The
only disagreement is with the state of existing law (and rights and duties)
post-strip, a distinct conversation about legal rights that is worth

435

See, e.g., Amar, Neo-Federalist, supra note ___, at 229-30 (synthesizing requirements of
Article III into requirement that some Article III court must have the power to resolve finally federal
questions and admiralty issues).
436
See Eisenberg, supra note ___, at 498 (describing struggle over congressional jurisdiction
as “recurrent example” of separation of powers generating inter-branch conflict).
437
See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note ___, at 977 (“”[I]ndividual judges may be subject to
indirect pressure through threats to deprive their court of resources or to curtail its jurisdiction.”);
Sager, Jurisdiction, supra note ___, at 67 (arguing that judicial independence requirements of
Article III require some effective form of Article III federal judicial review for claims of
constitutional right).
438
See REDISH, supra note ___, at 42 (arguing that due process requires that litigants have an
independent forum for the adjudication of constitutional rights).
439
See Eisenberg, supra note ___, at 504 (arguing that “changing circumstances” and “other
constitutional realities” compel the existence of lower federal courts with jurisdiction to perform
“critical functions” in resolving federal issues).
440
See supra Parts I.A.1-2.
441
See supra Parts I.A.3-4.
442
See supra Part A.B.
443
See Sager, Justice, supra note ___, at 421 (“[G]overnment is obliged to energetically pursue
the effacement of injustice’s entrenched consequences.”).
444
See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note ___, at 524 (criticizing Court’s decision in Morrison for
its “refusal to entertain the possibility of systemice constitutional wrong”); Smolla, supra note ___,
at 1145 (arguing that there was “a lameness to the assertion [in Bartnicki] that anytime an otherwise
private conversation implicates matters of public concern, freedom of speech must trump the right to
privacy”).
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having.445 But it is a conversation that does not affect the essential
power to merits strip.446

445

Cf. Wasserman, First Amendment Lochnerism, supra note ___, at ___ (arguing that it is
worth having a conversation about the proper balance between the freedom of speech and privacy).
446
Cf. Gunther, supra note ___, at 921 (arguing that jurisdiction-stripping proposal should be
rejected “because they are unwise and violate the ‘spirit’ of the Constitution, even if they are . . .
within the sheer legal authority of Congress”)

